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基于博弈论视角的电商企业价格战研究——以美团饿了么为例 被引量:3

Research on Price War of E-commerce Enterprises Based on Game Theory——Take Meituan as an Example
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摘要 随着大数据时代的到来,"互联网+餐饮"模式发展迅速,饿了么首先成为了"互联网+餐饮"这一新兴市场的龙头,像美团这样的后继者想要进入餐饮业网络订餐行业非常困难。基于此,文中从博弈论的角度研究美团外卖和饿了么的价格战,先分析二者处于囚徒困境情况下,美团外卖如何打破饿了么寡头垄断的壁垒,达到进入市场抢占市场份额的目的;其次,从厂商融资的角度来看二者的动态博弈,求解出其纳什均衡和帕累托最优。在美团成功进入市场后,基于二者重复博弈的角度,运用伯特兰德模型来分析二者之间的价格策略,求解出纳什均衡;最后,结合上文的内容来给出二者如何才能走出囚徒困境。 With the advent of the big data era,the Internet plus catering mode has developed rapidly.Starving has become the leading Internet plus restaurant market.It is very difficult for the successors like the US group to enter the catering industry.Based on this,this paper studies the price war between meituan takeout and hungry moo from the perspective of game theory.First,it analyzes how meituan takeout breaks the barriers of hungry moo oligopoly to enter the market and seize market share when they are in prisoner s dilemma.Secondly,from the perspective of manufacturer s financing,the dynamic game between them is analyzed,and the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal are solved.After meituan successfully entered the market,based on the perspective of repeated game,Bertrand model was used to analyze the price strategy between the two,and Nash equilibrium was solved.Finally,combined with the above content to give how to get out of the prisoner s dilemma.
作者 孔艳秋 KONG Yan-qiu(School of Economics,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China)
出处 《物流工程与管理》 2021年第8期105-108,共4页 Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词 囚徒困境 动态博弈 纳什均衡 伯特兰德模型 帕累托最优 prisoner s dilemma dynamic game Nash equilibrium Bertrand model Pareto optimality
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