摘要
我国已有逾六成的民营上市公司通过引入国有股东形成混合所有制结构,但迄今尚无研究辨明我国民营企业热衷"混改"的主要动因是获取资源还是寻求产权保护,而对此的讨论有助于明确我国民营经济当前最迫切的痛点。文章注意到,资源获取假说和产权保护假说对民营企业"混改"与其向下调整盈余之间关系的理论预期存在差别,这为辨明我国民营企业"混改"的动因提供了绝佳的研究场景。文章以2004-2018年我国A股民营上市公司为样本,研究发现民营企业"混改"将显著降低其向下调整盈余的程度,且"藏富"需求越大、所引入国有股东的保护作用越大,民营企业"混改"与其向下调整盈余之间的负向关系越明显。这说明寻求产权保护而非获取资源是我国民营企业"混改"的主要动因。文章从向下调整盈余的视角独辟蹊径,为理解和辨明我国民营企业"混改"的动因提供了新的思路和证据,也揭示了"混改"对象选择的重要性。我国民营经济当前最迫切的痛点是产权保护而非资源约束。因此,鼓励国有企业特别是中央国有企业参与产权保护需求较高的优质民营企业"混改",既是发展壮大我国民营经济的有效途径,也有利于不同所有制经济的有效融合,提高"混改"效率。
More than 60% of private listed firms in China have turned into a mixed ownership structure by introducing state-owned shareholders, but so far no research has distinguished whether the private firms rush to the mixed ownership reform(hereafter MOR) to get important resource or to seek protection, about which the discussion will help to clarify the most urgent points of our private economy. We note that the resource hypothesis and the protection hypothesis have different theoretical expectations of the relationship between the MOR of private firms and their downward earnings management, which provides an excellent setting for clarifying the motivation for private firms to carry out the MOR. Specifically, the resource hypothesis believes that based on factors such as political costs and capital management capabilities, the higher the degree of MOR of private firms, the higher the degree of their downward earnings management or there exists no significant difference. However, the protection hypothesis holds that if private firms carry out the MOR for property rights protection, their need for hiding wealth will decrease, and the degree of downward earnings management should be significantly lower. Using China’s A-share private listed firms from 2004 to 2018, we find that private firms will significantly reduce their downward earnings management after the MOR.Moreover, the greater the private firm’s need for hiding wealth and the protection the state-owned shareholders could bring, namely, when private firms face greater risks of predation, their ability to pay is stronger or their ability to refuse to pay is weaker, the more obvious negative relationship between the MOR of private firms and their downward earnings management. Further, the greater the protection brought by state-owned shareholders with higher administrative levels, larger scales, or older ages, the more obvious the negative relationship between the MOR of private firms and their downward earnings management. This paper concludes that seeking pro
作者
孙亮
刘春
Sun Liang;Liu Chun(International School of Business and Finance,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第8期109-122,共14页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772182,71972186)
国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790603)
广东省自然科学基金面上项目(2017A030313412)。
