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网络加密流量侧信道攻击研究综述

Survey of side channel attack on encrypted network traffic
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摘要 网络加密流量侧信道攻击通过分析、提取网络应用通信过程中泄露的数据包长度、时间等侧信道信息,能够识别用户的身份和行为,甚至还原用户输入的原始数据。基于信息论建立了网络加密流量侧信道攻击模型,使用统一的模型框架分析了代表性的指纹攻击、击键攻击和语音攻击的方法和效果,讨论了基于隐藏数据包长度和时间信息的防御方法,结合技术发展前沿对未来可能的研究方向进行了展望。 By analyzing and extracting information such as packet size and timing leaked during Web application communication,side channel attack on encrypted network traffic is able to recognize users'identity and behavior and even restore the original data entered by users.A model of side channel attack on encrypted network traffic according to information theory was developed.Based on the unified model,the methods and results of representative attacks such as fingerprinting attacks,keystroke attacks and speech attacks were analyzed in detail.Furthermore,defense methods of hiding packet size and timing information were discussed.At last,possible research directions were prospected with the frontiers of technology development.
作者 李玎 祝跃飞 芦斌 林伟 LI Ding;ZHU Yuefei;LU Bin;LIN Wei(Information Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处 《网络与信息安全学报》 2021年第4期114-130,共17页 Chinese Journal of Network and Information Security
基金 国家重点研发计划(2019QY1302)。
关键词 网络应用 加密流量 侧信道攻击 信息增益 web application encrypted traffic side channel attack information gain
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