摘要
布伦塔诺区分了心理现象与物理现象以及相应的两种感知,并在心理现象中进一步划分了表象、判断与情感活动,这些心理现象不是表象便是立足于表象之上。表象的意向关系是一种指向对象的关系,判断与情感活动则是一种对立的意向关系。胡塞尔认为布伦塔诺的意向关系是含糊而有歧义的,因此他对布伦塔诺关于两种现象的划分与心理现象的定义进行澄清,将布伦塔诺的意向关系改造为作为实项内容、立义特征与意向内容之统一体的意向性,并针对心理现象的定义提出了意向体验的定义,即任何一个意向体验或者是一个客体化行为,或者以客体化行为为基础。
Brentano distinguishes between psychological and physical phenomena and the two corresponding perceptions,and further divides psychological phenomena into three basic categories,namely appearance,judgment and emotional activity.They are either representation or based on representation.Intentional relationship of representation is a relationship to the object,while judgment and emotional activity are opposite intentional relationships.Husserl believes that Brentano's view on intentional relationship is ambiguous,so he clarifies Brentano's division of two phenomena and the definition of psychological phenomenon,and transforms Brentano's intentional relationship into intentionality,which includes real content,apprehension characteristics and intentional intent.Husserl defines the concept of intentional experience,claiming that any intentional experience is either an objectifying act or based on the objectifying act.
作者
谭习龙
TAN Xi-long(School of Classic Chinese Culture Studies,Guangzhou City Polytechnic,Guangzhou 510275,China)
出处
《太原学院学报（社会科学版）》
2021年第4期1-8,共8页
Journal of Taiyuan University(Social Science Edition)
基金
2019年国家社科基金后期资助项目“胡塞尔现象学与东方唯识学的比较研究”(19FZXB044)。
关键词
布伦塔诺
胡塞尔
意向关系
意向性
意向体验
Brentano
Husserl
intentional relationship
intentionality
intentional experience
