摘要
在碳减排政策下,基于电力供需平衡,针对电网公司、可再生能源发电商和不可再生能源发电商组成的系统,研究了可再生能源电价补贴机制.将基于玻尔兹曼分布的碳排放配额分配方法和二氧化碳溢出效应引入模型,研究了电网公司、可再生能源发电商、不可再生能源发电商的最优决策,系统参数对系统均衡的影响,以及补贴策略对成员决策的影响.最后,分析了玻尔兹曼分布参数、二氧化碳溢出效应参数和可再生能源最优电价补贴的关系.结果表明:无论是否考虑二氧化碳溢出效应都存在均衡策略,考虑二氧化碳排放溢出效应的情况下,二氧化碳溢出效应参数越大,电力被输送地区补偿给电力生产地区的碳排放配额的额度应越高,而且电网公司给予可再生能源发电商的最优电价补贴也越高,当二氧化碳溢出效应一定时,存在最优的玻尔兹曼分布参数使可再生能源最优电价补贴最小.
Under the current carbon reduction policies,the price subsidy mechanism of renewable energy is studied for the system composed of power grid company,renewable energy generator and non-renewable energy generator based on the power supply-demand balance.The paper employs the method of carbon quota allocation based on Boltzmann distribution and carbon dioxide spillover effect to construct model in order to explore the optimal decisions of power grid company,renewable energy generator and non-renewable energy generator,the impacts of system parameters on system equilibrium,as well as how the optimal decisions affect the members’ decisions.Finally,the relationship among Boltzmann distribution parameter,carbon dioxide spillover effect parameter and optimal price subsidy for renewable energy is discussed.The results show that equilibrium solution exists with and without considering carbon dioxide spillover effect,the carbon emission quotas compensated by areas where power is transmitted to areas where power is produced and optimal price subsidy of renewable energy both increase with the carbon dioxide spillover effect parameter,when the carbon dioxide spillover effect parameter is fixed,there is an optimal Boltzmann distribution parameter to minimize the optimal price subsidy for renewable energy.
作者
宋卓
王红蕾
SONG Zhuo;WANG Honglei(School of Management,Guizhou University,Guiyang 55002)
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第4期1007-1023,共17页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
南方电网(066601(2016)030101XT198)资助课题。
关键词
碳排放配额
玻尔兹曼分布参数
二氧化碳溢出效应
可再生能源
电价补贴机制
Carbon emission quotas
Boltzmann distribution parameter
carbon dioxide spillover effect
renewable energy
electricity price subsidy mechanism
