摘要
双阶段休假模式是一种将单重工作休假策略与多重休假策略相结合而得到一种更复杂且符合实际生活的休假模式,在该系统中工作台间断的进行工作休假与休假.基于排队博弈理论对具有双阶段休假模式的M/M/1排队系统,顾客在完全可见和几乎可见两种信息程度下的均衡进队策略进行研究,推导得出不同信息程度下顾客进队均衡策略.最后,对银行排队系统进行实例分析,并对两种信息程度下参数灵敏性进行分析.
Two-stages vacations queueing system is a kind of complex queueing system with single working vacation and multiple vacations.In this system,the server intermittently performs work vacations and vacations.Based on the game-theoretic,we analyze that there exist equilibrium strategies of threshold type in the fully observable and almost observable cases in the two-stages vacations M/M/1 queue.We find the customer equilibrium strategy under two different information levels of observable case.Finally,an example is given to analyze the bank queuing system,and the parameter sensitivity under two different information levels is analyzed.
作者
武彧睿
叶晴晴
熊萍萍
陈莹
WU Yu-rui;YE Qing-qing;XIONG Ping-ping;CHEN Ying(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2021年第9期154-165,共12页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(11901307,71701105)
江苏省自然科学基金(BK20180783)
江苏省高校自然科学研究面上项目(18KJB110021)。
