摘要
股权质押作为高效且便捷的融资方式受到上市公司的青睐,其经济后果也引发学术界和实务界的广泛关注。已有研究发现控股股东股权质押对盈余管理、大股东占款、会计政策选择、企业价值等具有影响,但是尚无研究关注控股股东股权质押对管理层业绩预告披露行为的影响。利用2003年至2016年中国沪深A股上市企业股权质押和管理层业绩预告数据,采用Logit回归、倾向评分匹配法+双重差分法、Heckman两阶段方法,检验控股股东是否发生股权质押和股权质押比例大小对于管理层业绩预告披露意愿、披露频率、预告性质和预告精确度的影响,并进一步对比预告业绩与实际业绩的差异,揭示股权质押行为中潜在的信息披露风险。研究结果表明,控股股东股权质押显著降低了管理层业绩预告披露的意愿和质量。相对于未发生控股股东股权质押的企业,发生控股股东股权质押的企业披露自愿性业绩预告的可能性更低、业绩预告频率更低、更倾向于发布正向业绩预告、业绩预告精确度也更低;当控股股东股权质押比例提高、存在连续质押行为时,管理层业绩预告披露意愿和质量进一步降低;对比预告业绩与之后披露的实际业绩的偏离程度发现,控股股东股权质押促使管理层采取更为激进的预告策略,预告业绩与实际业绩的正向偏离度更大、一致性更低;细分产权性质的影响后发现,相对于国有企业,控股股东股权质押对管理层业绩预告披露的负面影响在民营企业中更为突出。通过理论分析和实证检验,将控股股东股权质押的经济后果研究拓展到自愿性信息披露领域,为股权质押的经济后果研究提供了新的视角,丰富了管理层业绩预告披露的影响因素研究。提醒监管部门和投资者进一步关注和防范股权质押业务中潜在的信息披露风险,对管理层业绩预告披露监管具有一�
Stock pledge is favored by listed companies as an efficient and convenient financing method.The economic consequence of stock pledge received widespread concerns from both academic and practical fields.Previous studies pay attention to the effect of controlling shareholders’stock pledge on earnings management,major shareholders’tunneling,accounting policy choices and firm value.However,the impact of controlling shareholders’stock pledge on management earnings forecast disclosures still remains unexplored.Using Chinese A-share listed companies stock pledge and management earnings forecast data from 2003-2016,this study empirically tests the impacts of whether controlling shareholders have stock pledge and their stock pledge percentage on management earnings forecast incentives,forecast frequency,forecast characteristics and forecast precision.This paper employs the methods of Logit,propensity score matching and difference-in-differences(PSM+DID),and Heckman two-stage sample selection method.In addition,this paper compares the dispersion of companies’forecasted performance and actual performance,in order to reveal the potential information disclosure risks in stock pledge.The result shows that controlling shareholders’stock pledge significantly reduces companies’management earnings forecast incentive and forecast quality.Compared with firms having no controlling shareholders’stock pledge,firms with controlling shareholders’stock pledge tend to disclose earnings forecast less voluntarily,less frequently,more actively and less accurately.The tendency and quality of management earnings forecast further reduce when the percentage of pledge increases and the controlling shareholders continue to pledge their stocks in consecutive years.After comparing the dispersion of forecasted performance and actual performance,we find that controlling shareholders’stock pledge tends to lead the management to adopt more aggressive forecasting strategy.The dispersion between forecasted performance and actual performan
作者
文雯
乔菲
陈胤默
WEN Wen;QIAO Fei;CHEN Yinmo(International Business School,Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing 100089,China;Accounting School,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Institute of World Economics and Politics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100732,China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期145-159,共15页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(72002014)
北京市社会科学基金(19YJC040)
中国侨联一般项目(19BZQK208)
辽宁省社会科学规划基金(L20CGL009)
辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目(LN2020Q17)。
关键词
股权质押
管理层业绩预告
自愿性信息披露
披露意愿
披露质量
披露策略
产权性质
stock pledge
management earnings forecast
voluntary information disclosure
disclosure incentive
disclosure quality
disclosure strategy
property rights
