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代理冲突及其制度安排对税收规避的影响 被引量:1

The Influence of Agency Conflicts and its Institutional Arrangements on Tax Avoidance
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摘要 代理冲突会使代理人产生税收规避动机,缓解代理冲突需要一系列的机制设计和制度安排。研究发现,薪酬激励和股权激励对税收规避都有显著的正面影响;资本结构和资产结构对税收规避都有显著的负面影响;股权集中度对税收规避有显著的正面影响,股权制衡度对税收规避有显著的正面影响,独立董事比例对税收规避有显著的负面影响;政府持股比例大于税收分成比例时,税收规避更严重,各级政府扮演着税收征管者和避税人的双重角色。因此,应从加强避税监管、完善公司治理、优化财务政策等方面采取措施,压缩代理人的避税空间。 The agency conflict may cause the agent to come into the motivation of tax avoidance.Alleviating the agency conflict requires a series of mechanism design and institutional arrangements.Based on the special institutional environment of China,the paper takes listed manufacturing companies in China as the research object and makes the theoretical analysis and empirical test on how agency conflicts and institutional arrangements affect tax avoidance.The results show that salary incentive and equity incentive have significant positive effects on tax avoidance;the capital structure and asset structure have significant negative effects on tax avoidance;the equity concentration has significant positive effects on tax avoidance;the equity balance has significant positive effects on tax avoidance;the proportion of independent directors has significant negative effects on tax avoidanc,and the government ownership ratio has significant negative effects on tax evasion,the tax avoidance is more serious when the government ownership ratio is larger than its proportion of tax share,the governments at all levels play the dual roles of tax collectors and tax evaders.The above findings show that the principal-agent theory has strong explanatory power for the tax avoidance behavior of China's listed companies,the agents have motives to turn the public tax revenue into the private interests of individuals or small groups.Therefore,Measures should be taken in strengthening tax avoidance supervision,improving corporate governance,and optimizing financial policies to reduce the tax avoidance space of agents.
作者 黄晓波 龚新颍 袁慧敏 HUANG Xiaobo;GONG Xinying;YUAN Huimin(Business School,Hubei University,Wuhan 430062,China)
机构地区 湖北大学商学院
出处 《经济与管理》 CSSCI 2021年第3期49-58,共10页 Economy and Management
基金 2018年度湖北社科基金项目(HBSK2018041)。
关键词 委托代理理论 代理冲突 税收规避 principal-agent theory agency conflict tax avoidance
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