摘要
针对未来双边报价市场模式下的购电商竞价问题,提出了一种基于信息完全非合作博弈的竞价模型。首先借鉴发电商边际成本曲线的方式,构建了购电商简化后的竞价行为模型;其次,综合考虑各购电商自身成本、对方报价行为及电网安全运行等约束,建立了双层博弈模型,其上层模型描述了各购电商在信息完全环境下的博弈行为,下层模型描述了计及网络安全约束经济调度出清模型;最后,提出了一种强化粒子群算法求解所建双层模型。采用标准3机9节点系统验证了所提模型的有效性。
In order to solve bidding problems of electricity purchasers in the future market mode of bilateral quotation,an electricity purchaser bidding model based on non-cooperative game of information completeness was proposed in this paper.Firstly,a simplified bidding behavior model was established for electricity purchasers with help of marginal cost curve of power generators.Secondly,under comprehensive consideration of constraints such as purchaser’s own cost,counterpart’s bidding behavior and safe grid operation,a two-layer game model was established.Its upper layer described game behaviors of electricity purchasers in the environment of complete information,while the lower layer described a clearing model of economic dispatch considering network security constraint.Finally,an enhanced particle swarm optimization algorithm was introduced to solve the two-layer model.The validity of the proposed model was verified through the standard 3-machine 9-node system.
作者
黄国日
张翔
陈政
易江文
张元
Huang Guori;Zhang Xiang;Chen Zheng;Yi Jiangwen;Zhang Yuan(China Southern Power Grid Energy Development Research Institute, Guangzhou Guangdong 510663, China;Tsinghua Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Chengdu Sichuan 610000, China)
出处
《电气自动化》
2021年第2期47-49,52,共4页
Electrical Automation
基金
中国南方电网有限责任公司科技项目(编号:ZBKJXM20180373)。
关键词
信息完全
非合作博弈
强化粒子群算法
购电商竞价
information completeness
non-cooperative game
enhanced particle swarm optimization algorithm
bidding of electricity purchasers
