摘要
在我国财政分权体制下,中央转移支付能否激励地方政府增加教育支出?基于省级面板数据的实证结果表明:一般转移支付本身对地方教育支出没有激励效应;专项转移支付可以激励地方政府增加教育支出。此外,研究还发现财政分权可以调节转移支付与地方政府教育支出的关系,这具体体现为:一般转移支付通过财政分权对地方教育支出产生了负向激励;财政分权会削弱专项转移支付的激励效应,且随着财政分权度不断增加,专项转移支付的正向激励会变为负向激励。考虑到极大多数省份的财政分权度尚未达到分权临界值,专项转移支付仍可以激励地方政府增加教育支出。基于实证结果,为保障地方财政的教育投入,中央扩大配套的教育专项转移支付规模更加合适。
This paper uses provincial panel data to test the incentive effect of central transfer payments on local government education expenditures.The study found that general transfer payments themselves have no incentive effect on local education expenditures;special transfer payments can encourage local governments to increase education expenditures.The study also found that fiscal decentralization can adjust the relationship between transfer payments and local government education expenditures:general transfer payments generate negative incentives for local education expenditures through fiscal decentralization;the positive incentives of special transfer payments will be weakened by fiscal decentralization,and as fiscal decentralization continues to increase,the positive incentives for special transfer payments will become negative incentives.Considering that fiscal decentralization in most provinces has not reached the critical value of decentralization,special transfer payments can still encourage local governments to increase education expenditures.Based on the empirical results,in order to ensure fiscal spending in education,it is more appropriate for the central government to expand the scale of special transfer payments.
作者
王悦
Wang Yue(School of Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2021年第1期19-26,共8页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
基金
2021年中南财经政法大学研究生科研创新平台硕士研究生实践创新项目:中央转移支付对地方政府教育支出的激励作用研究(项目编号:202110418)。部分研究成果。
关键词
中央转移支付
财政分权
地方教育支出
激励效应
Central Transfer Payment
Fiscal Decentralization
Local Fiscal Expenditure on Education
Incentive Effect
