摘要
中央政府将环境保护纳入地方政府官员政绩考核的制度安排与环保政绩考核目标从“底线控制”转向总的生态治理效果最大化紧密相关。文章基于双重激励机制的竞赛视角建立理论模型,比较转变前后两类环保政绩考核方案的实施效果与适用条件。研究结论表明,两类考核机制在各地方政府的成本参数和分布函数满足某一临界值的情况下,采用正向奖励或负向惩罚之间无差异;在各地方政府表现出区位、禀赋、生态偏好、治理能力等方面的异质性或成本参数差异时,采用奖罚并举的策略组合需要满足地方政府之间生态治理能力或成本参数差异较大(小)、中央政府加大对考核优等(劣等)地方政府的奖励(惩罚)。奖罚临界值与参与竞赛考核的地方政府信息分布函数、成本参数、参赛规模和奖罚金额等有关。信息分布函数的凸性、成本参数的增大、参赛规模的扩大以及奖罚金额的不对等都有可能扩大惩罚机制的适用范围。两类环保政绩考核方案是与经济发展阶段和公众对环保认知状态相适应的,有助于实现不同时期的发展任务。在当前经济发展阶段,将生态文明纳入地方政府领导干部政绩考核,作为其职级升迁的一项强约束指标,有助于激励地方政府加大环保努力投入水平,使竞赛机制的竞争特性贯穿环保制度制定、监督和执行的始终。基于此,从充分认识地方政府生态治理成本差异、合理界定考核机制实施范围、奖罚分明、确保惩罚机制稳定实施等方面提出完善现行环保政绩考核方案的对策建议,以期推动我国生态治理和经济发展协同共进。
There has been a significant change in the Chinese central government’s institutional arrangement of incorporating environmental protection into the performance assessment of local government officials,which is closely related to the shift of the goal of environmental performance assessment from‘bottom line control’to the maximization of the overall effect of ecological governance.From the perspective of the dual contest incentive mechanism,this paper establishes a theoretical model to compare and analyze the implementation effect and applicable conditions of the two kinds of environmental performance assessment schemes before and after the transformation.The results show that:When the cost parameters and distribution functions of local governments meet a certain critical value,there is no difference between positive rewards and negative punishments.When local governments show heterogeneity in location,endowment,ecological preference,governance ability and other aspects or difference in cost parameters,the combination of rewards and punishments should meet the following requirements:there is a large(small)difference in ecological governance ability or cost parameters between local governments,and the central government increases the reward(punishment)to local governments that are assessed as superior(inferior).The critical value of rewards and punishments is related to the information distribution function,cost parameter,scale of competition and amount of rewards and punishments of local governments participating in the competition.The convexity of the information distribution function,the increase of the cost parameter,the expansion of the competitive scale,and the inequality of rewards and punishments may expand the scope of the application of the punishment mechanism.The two kinds of environmental performance assessment schemes are suitable for the economic development stage and the public’s cognition of environmental protection,which is helpful to realize the development tasks in different periods.In
作者
张明
宋妍
ZHANG Ming;SONG Yan(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining&Technology,Xuzhou Jiangsu 221116,China;School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi′an Shaanxi 710071,China)
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第2期34-43,共10页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“‘差异-协同’视角下大气污染区域治理的政策效果、演化稳定性及其保障机制研究”(批准号:71874189)
“空间关联视角下大气污染区域协同治理演化博弈与机制设计研究”(批准号:71774158)
江苏省社会科学基金项目研究成果“长三角区域大气污染协同减排成本核算及其分担保障机制研究”(批准号:18JD013)。
关键词
环保政绩考核
软性约束
实质问责
制度效果
environmental performance assessment
soft constraint
substantial accountability assessment
institutional effect
