摘要
在基层治理中,激励机制是与治理事务相匹配的,不同性质的治理事务配套不同类型、不同强度的激励措施,其中作为政治任务的治理事务内含着较强的政治激励。在县级部门、乡镇街道等基层单位,存在两种性质不同的事务,分别是岗位工作和"领导交办的事"。岗位工作是法定的行政业务,是每个占据工作岗位的人必须承担的职责。"领导交办的事"是岗位工作之外的事情,是领导关注和重视的事务,具有"政治任务"性质,激励效应较强。实践中,在岗位工作与"领导交办的事"之间存在一个弹性空间,工作人员既可只承担岗位工作,又可二者兼顾。由于不同的岗位工作差异性大,难以用统一的标准来衡量和比较,在基层单位实践中,作为额外工作的"领导交办的事"就成为单位评价工作人员表现的重要指标。那些既做好岗位工作又积极承担"领导交办的事"的人,被认为是积极上进和有工作能力的人,因而容易获得领导的认可和器重,他们在单位的政治地位、晋升空间相对较大。该人事激励机制既不完全遵循西方科层制逻辑,又与中国式关系主义有一定距离,交揉了事本主义和人格化的特征。一方面,它以治理事务或问题为基准,使激励与治理事务相匹配,具有较强的针对性、导向性和规定性,另一方面主要领导对治理事务或问题的遴选及评价有较大自主空间,使该人事激励带有较强的灵活性、适应性和人格烙印。
In the grass-roots governance, the incentive mechanism is matched with the governance affairs, i.e. affairs of different nature go with different types and intensities of incentive measures, among which governance affairs, also known as political tasks, bear strong political incentives. In grassroots units such as county-level departments, township streets are found two kinds of affairs of different nature, namely, routine work and "tasks assigned by leaders". The former refers to administrative affairs within, falling into staff’s responsibility who occupies the post. The latter refers to those without but leaders attach importance to, and thus labeled as "political task" with a strong incentive effect. In practice, there is a flexible space in-between: the staff may either choose to fulfill his/her duty, or choose to take both into account, an important indicator to an assessment of one’s performance in grassroots units as a uniform criteria is hard to make due to a great disparity between jobs of different posts. Those taking extra work are labeled as so positive, progressive and capable that they are easily recognized and valued by leaders, thus their political status higher and promotion more likely. Such a mechanism does not follow the logic of Western bureaucracy while keeps a certain distance from Chinese Relationism;in addition, it integrates the characteristics of matter-orientedness and personality. On the one hand, this mechanism takes the governance affairs or problems as the benchmark to make the incentive match with the governance affairs, thus bearing strong pertinence, guidance and stipulation. On the other hand, it offers main leaders greater autonomy in the selection and evaluation of governance affairs or problems, thus the personnel incentive with stronger flexibility, adaptability and personality brand.
作者
杨华
YANG Hua(School of Sociology,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
出处
《广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2021年第1期94-110,共17页
Journal of Guangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“全面从严治党视域下基层‘小官贪腐’治理机制研究”(18YJC710086)。
关键词
科层制
中心工作
岗位工作
政治任务
晋升锦标赛
部门缝隙
人事激励机制
bureaucracy
central task
duty-bound tasks
political task
promotion tournament
department gap
personnel incentive mechanism
