摘要
问询函是交易所监管上市公司的重要手段。问询函除能起到直接监管作用外,能否激发公司利益相关者的监督从而产生间接治理作用?本文尝试从控股股东掏空视角对该问题进行解答。研究发现,问询函能激发公司外部利益相关者的监督,从而抑制控股股东掏空,但没有发现其激发公司内部利益相关者监督的证据。进一步研究表明,当两权分离度较大和公司信息环境较差时,问询函监管对控股股东掏空的抑制作用更为显著。本研究一方面丰富了问询函产生治理效应的作用机理,另一方面为监管层着力保护中小投资者利益、促进我国资本市场健康有序发展提供了有益参考。
The comment letter has gradually become an important way for exchanges to supervision listed companies.However,the research on the indirect mechanism of comment letter supervision is still very limited.This paper examined whether comment letters can inspire the governance of company’s stakeholders.The research results show that compared with the company’s internal stakeholders,the comment letter can more inspire the supervision of the company’s external stakeholders that restrain the tunneling of controlling shareholders.Our further analysis indicates that this negative relation is stronger when the controlling shareholder’s tunneling motivation is higher or when the company faces worse information environment.This paper not only enriches the indirect mechanism of the comment letter,but also helps protect the interests of small investors and promoting the healthy and well development of the capital market.
作者
曹丰
易佳慧
胡明生
CAO Feng;YI Jia-hui;HU Ming-sheng
出处
《财务研究》
CSSCI
2021年第1期80-93,共14页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972068,71602053)
湖南省自然科学基金项目(2018JJ3087)
关键词
问询函
利益相关者
控股股东
掏空
中介效应
comment letters
stakeholders
controlling shareholders
tunneling
mediating effect
