摘要
选择300家战略性新兴企业作为样本进行实证研究,结果发现银企博弈的关键在于银行体系对于风险程度的衡量。“海萨尼转换”博弈模型研究显示,政府补贴/贴息以及建立风险缓释机制并不能有效降低企业违约动机,而信息互换平台和违约惩罚机制的建立能够部分解决信息不对称问题,对于规范银企行为有积极作用。基于此,建议减少政府贴息,转而设立研发激励机制;建立信息互换平台和风险缓释机制;发展多方合作模式,加强银行业务创新;构建奖罚机制,减少信贷主体道德风险。
The paper selects 300 strategic emerging enterprises as samples for empirical research. Result shows that the key to the banking-enterprise game is the measurement of the degree of risk by the banking system. According to the results of the "Harsanyi transformation" game, government subsidies/interest discounts and the establishment of risk mitigation mechanism can not effectively reduce the motivation of enterprise default, while the establishment of information exchange platform and default penalty mechanism can partially solve the problem of information asymmetry, which has a positive role in promoting the behavior of bank and enterprise. Based on these, it proposes to reduce government discounts and instead establish an R & D incentive mechanism, establish an information exchange platform and risk mitigation mechanism, develops a multi-party cooperation model to strengthen banking business innovation, and builds a reward and punishment mechanism to reduce the moral hazard of credit entities.
作者
胡吉亚
HU Ji-ya(Institute of Finance,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 102488)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期1-6,共6页
Soft Science
基金
北京市社会科学基金项目(19YJB013)
中国社会科学院大学卓越项目(校20180009)。
关键词
战略性新兴产业
信贷融资
信息不对称
海萨尼转换
strategic emerging industries
credit financing
information asymmetry
Harsanyi transformation
