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作为道德主体的人的观念之争——罗尔斯原初状态下的人的观念与社群主义者对之的批评

Debate on Conception of Person as Moral Subject——Rawls’s concept of man in his original state and the criticism of communitarians
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摘要 罗尔斯正义论的核心关切,在于制定一个正义的秩序以确保每个人在其中能够过有价值的生活。为了保证正义对善的这种优先性,罗尔斯在论证正义原则时,以康德的先验主体为蓝本,设计了原初状态下的立约者。以桑德尔为代表的社群主义者认为,罗尔斯原初状态下的道德主体是一种无拘的自我、一种个体式的自我,因此,罗尔斯的人的观念是虚假和贫乏的,它不仅有违于我们日常的自我洞察,也忽视了自我的构成性特征。尽管自由主义者可以回应称社群主义者的批评是对罗尔斯的误解,但它仍旧难以摆脱在真实性和可欲性维度上的质疑——自由主义对人的抽象以及对人与其善观念之间关系的理解与我们的日常体察是不符的,同时,从这种自我出发会歪曲我们对人以及人与社群之间的关系的理解。 The core concern of Rawls’theory of justice is to establish a just order in which everyone can live a valuable life.In order to ensure the priority of justice over good,Rawls designed the contractor the original position based on Kant’s transcendental subject.The communitarians represented by Sandel believe that Rawls’moral subject in the original position is a kind of unencumbered self and an individual self.Therefore,Rawls’conception of the person is false and disembodied,which not only violates our daily self-perception,but also ignores the constructive characteristics of self.Although liberals can respond that communitarians’criticism is a misunderstanding of Rawls,it is still difficult to get rid of the doubts in the dimension of authenticity and desirability.Liberalism's abstract understanding of person and understanding of the relationship between person and his conceptions of good is inconsistent with our real practical experience.At the same time,from this kind of self,the understanding of our community and all kinds of relationships is misguided.
作者 乔欢 Qiao Huan(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处 《衡阳师范学院学报》 2021年第1期61-66,共6页 Journal of Hengyang Normal University
关键词 人的观念 道德主体 自由主义 社群主义 the conception of the person moral subject liberalism communitarianism

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