摘要
针对双渠道闭环供应链的正向销售和逆向回收之间严重脱节的问题,基于线性需求函数,构建由制造商、线上和线下渠道商及消费者组成的双渠道闭环供应链集中和分散决策模型,通过Stackelberg博弈理论分析发现,分散决策下存在明显的"双重边际化"现象,为此,设计回收奖惩契约及正向特许经营与逆向成本分摊契约对供应链进行协调。研究表明:回收奖惩协调机制能使双渠道闭环供应链各主体的定价和供应链系统利润均达到集中决策时的最优水平,实现了该契约机制下双渠道供应链的帕累托最优。而正向特许经营与逆向成本分摊机制又能使双渠道闭环供应链各主体在正向供应链上积极销售和在逆向供应链上积极回收。
Aiming at the serious disconnect between the forward sales and reverse recycling of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain,based on the linear demand function,this paper constructs a two-channel closed-loop supply chain centralized and decentralized decision-making model composed of manufacturers,online and offline channels,and consumers.Also,through the analysis of Stackelberg game theory,it is found that there is a clear"double marginalization"phenomenon under decentralized decision-making.For this reason,the recovery reward and punishment contract and the forward franchising and reverse cost-sharing contract are designed to coordinate the supply chain.The research shows that the recycling reward and punishment coordination mechanism can make the pricing and profits of each subject of the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain reach the optimal level of centralized decision-making,reaching the"Pareto Optimality"of the dual-channel supply chain under the contract mechanism.The forward franchise and reverse cost-sharing mechanism can also enable the entities in the dual-channel closed-loop supply chain to actively sell in the forward supply chain and actively recycle in the reverse supply chain.
作者
范定祥
李重莲
宾厚
FAN Dingxiang;LI Chonglian;BIN Hou(School of Economics and Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China;School of Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2021年第1期85-92,共8页
Economy and Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL177)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(18YJA630001)
湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20190853)。
关键词
双渠道闭环供应链
回收奖惩契约
正向特许经营与逆向成本分摊契约
供应链协调
dual-channel closed-loop supply chain
recycling reward and punishment contract
forward franchising and reverse costsharing contract
supply chain coordination
