摘要
税收征管对企业财务会计行为的影响一直受到广泛关注,但如何界定政府税收征管力度仍引起学者较大争议。本文以2003—2006年中国工业企业为样本,以2002年“所得税分享改革”为自然实验,采用断点回归设计方法,研究了税收征管力度对企业盈余管理的影响。研究发现,国税局征管能够抑制企业的盈余管理行为,尤其降低了企业向下盈余管理程度。进一步研究发现,民营企业、位于竞争激烈行业内企业、位于市场化程度低省份的企业,国税局征管对企业盈余管理行为的抑制作用更为明显。上述结果表明,税收征管作为一种有效的公司外部治理机制,可以通过增强税收征管力度来有效抑制公司的盈余管理行为。
The impact of tax enforcement on corporate financial and accounting behavior has been widely concerned,but how to define the strength of government tax enforcement has caused great controversy among scholars.This paper uses the natural experiment of Income Tax Sharing Reform in China to measure the tax enforcement and study its impact on corporate earnings management.Based on manufacturing enterprises between 2003 and 2006 in China and regression discontinuity design,we find that the tax enforcement of the National Tax Bureau inhibits the firms’earnings management,especially the downward earnings management behavior is greatly decreased.Further research shows that private firms,firms in highly competitive industries,and firms in provinces with low degree of marketization have a more obvious inhibiting effect on firm’s earnings management behavior by tax enforcement.The above results show that tax enforcement,as an effective external governance mechanism of the company,can effectively restrain the firm’s earnings management behavior by increasing the intensity of tax enforcement.
作者
李青原
蒋倩倩
Li Qingyuan;Jiang Qianqian(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University)
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期3-16,共14页
Economic Review
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“供给侧结构性改革与发展新动力研究”(项目编号:16ZDA006)的阶段性成果。
关键词
税收征管
盈余管理
所得税分享改革
Tax Levying
Surplus Management
Income Tax Sharing Reform
