摘要
本文考察了地方官员晋升激励影响微观企业技术创新的机理,分析政绩考核制度对上述关系的影响,并将企业与地级市官员治理数据相匹配进行检验,结果发现:地方官员的晋升压力显著损害了企业技术创新,而政绩考核新标准实施后,官员晋升压力对企业技术创新的抑制效应得到改善。进一步检验发现,晋升压力对企业技术创新的负面影响只存于官员长任期组、受教育程度高组和非国有企业组。这些组的地方官员晋升压力越大,企业的技术创新越低。然而,晋升压力与技术创新的负面影响只存在于低财政分权组,从而排除了财政分权对结论的替代性解释。本研究深化了企业技术创新的文献,并从微观层面丰富了官员晋升激励如何影响我国经济增长质量和经济结构转型,从而为我国领导干部的政绩考核提供参考。
Speeding up the construction of an innovative country is one of China’s strategic plans.The technological innovation of micro-firms is the fundamental driving force and the source of sustained economic growth,as well as the main direction of improving the supply-side structure.So,based on the background of unprecedented economic growth under China’s decentralization system as well as the theory of promotion incentives and agency theory,the paper investigates the effects of promotion pressure of local officials on technological innovation of micro-firms,and analyzes the impact of political achievement system on the above relationship from a micro perspective.Then the above analyses are tested using the matched data of listed company samples and the governance data of local officials in municipal-level cities from 2007 to 2016.The empirical results show that promotion pressure of local leaders significantly damages technological innovation of firms.And the negative relationship between promotion pressure and technological innovation of micro-companies is significantly weakened after using the new performance evaluation standards.Furthermore,the more promotion pressure they face,such as non-SOE,or located in regions with the officials'longer tenure,or higher education level,the technological innovation of firms within these regions is significantly lower.In addition,the negative relationship between promotion pressure and technological innovation only exists in firms located in regions with lower degree of fiscal decentralization.So,this paper rules out the alternative explanation of fiscal decentralization hypothesis.The finds mean that local officials promote the growth of local enterprises through biased allocated resources for the consideration of self-interest.The contributions of this paper are as follows.On the one hand,we expand the theoretical research of enterprise technological innovation in the context of transition economy.On the other hand,we deepen the literature about technological innovation fro
作者
程仲鸣
虞涛
潘晶晶
张烨
Cheng Zhongming;Yu Tao;Pan Jingjing;Zhang Ye(Financial Research Institute,Wenzhou University;Business School,Wenzhou University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期64-75,共12页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL048、14BGL036)资助。
关键词
晋升激励
技术创新
经济质量
地方官员
Promotion Incentives
Technological Innovation
Economic Quality
Local Officials