摘要
审计师是保障资本市场健康发展的重要监督力量,但近年来频频曝光的审计师与公司高管合谋造假事件沉重打击了投资者对资本市场的信心,使学界和实务界不得不重新审视公司与会计师事务所之间的聘用关系。因此,从客户与审计师聘用关系的视角探讨其对资本市场的影响具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。基于审计服务供求双方博弈的视角,考察客户与审计师匹配关系对公司股价崩盘风险的影响及其作用机理。以2007年至2018年中国沪、深A股上市公司为研究对象,基于固定效应模型,运用Stata 15.0软件进行多元回归分析和PSM分析,实证检验客户与审计师匹配关系对公司股价崩盘风险的影响,并探讨内部治理机制和外部监督力量对这一影响的治理效应。利用DID方法,基于监督治理和信号传递两种可能的理论路径,进一步验证客户与审计师匹配关系影响公司股价崩盘风险的作用机理。研究结果表明,客户与审计师向下不匹配关系加剧了股价崩盘风险,但客户与审计师向上不匹配关系抑制了股价崩盘风险的假说没有得到实证支持。向下不匹配关系对股价崩盘风险的影响主要来自于审计监督治理的低效,没有直接证据证明客户与审计师向下不匹配是公司股价崩盘风险的信号表征,为监督治理论提供了经验证据。进一步分析发现,在会计稳健性较高以及受到分析师关注较多的治理环境下,客户与审计师向下不匹配关系与股价崩盘之间的加剧效应得以缓解,为内部治理和外部监督有效性提供了证据支持。主要研究结果在进一步控制相关变量、使用替代指标、剔除干扰样本、考虑自选择偏差等问题之后依然稳健。研究结果验证了客户与审计师匹配关系-审计监督有效性-会计信息质量-股价崩盘风险的逻辑链条,在丰富和完善客户与审计师匹配关系以及股价崩盘风险相关�
Auditors are regarded as a critical monitoring force to ensure the healthy development of the capital market.However,collusion between auditing firms or auditors and their clients’managers has provoked some scandals,which has dramatically dampened investors’confidence and inspired academics and practitioners to review the client-auditor relationship.Therefore,exploring the influence of the client-auditor employment relationship on the capital market is of great theoretical and practical significance.From a game perspective of supply and demand,this study examines the impact of client-auditor matches on stock price crash risk and the underlying mechanisms.To be more specific,this study focuses on Chinese A-stock companies between 2007 and 2018.It uses Stata 15.0 to conduct multiple regression analyses on how client-auditor matches influence the stock price crash risk and how internal governance and external monitoring adjust the effect accordingly.We also use the method of propensity score matching to address the endogeneity problems.Besides,in order to verify the specific mechanism for the above stated influence,we carry out theoretical exploration from two aspects of monitoring governance and signal transmission,and use difference-in-difference method to identify the profound internal logic of the influence that client-auditor matches exert on stock price crash risk.This study’s empirical results show that the client-auditor downward mismatches increase the client’s stock price crash risk.However,there is no empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the client-auditor upward mismatches inhibit stock price crash risk.Our further research finds that the client-auditor downward mismatches aggravate the risk of stock price crash is mainly due to the incompetent auditor monitoring.Our study’s results are consistent with the monitoring theory;yet our results do not support the signaling theory.Besides,the influence that the client-auditor downward mismatches have on stock price crash risk will be wea
作者
傅超
王文姣
何娜
FU Chao;WANG Wenjiao;HE Na(Accounting School,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou 310018,China;Management School,Sichuan Agricultural University,Chengdu 611130,China;Accounting School,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期67-81,共15页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71702041)。
