摘要
“不可知论”是休谟哲学的一个经典形象,“不可知的实在论”是“新休谟”学者提供的这一形象的当代版本。然而,这一版本蕴含了两个并不适合阐发休谟哲学的形而上学前提——心物二元与表象主义实在论。究其缘由,学者们往往夸大休谟认识论与笛卡尔、洛克认识论的连续性,而未意识到这两种认识论的根本不同。一个适合刻画休谟认识论的形而上学前提是“知觉一元论”哲学,这一哲学取消了心灵与外部世界的关系问题,只从知觉世界内部提出认知的规范或真理问题。由此休谟给出了独特的信念及其辩护理论,该理论扭转了近代认识论的运思方向,展露出当代西方知识论的诸多特征。
Agnosticism is a classic feature of Hume s philosophy,and agnostic realism is a contemporary version of this feature proposed by scholars of a“New Hume”.However,this version contains two metaphysical presuppositions which are not suitable to expound Hume s philosophy:representative realism and dualism of mind and matter.Scholars tend to exaggerate the continuity between Hume s epistemology and that of Descartes and Locke s without realizing the fundamental differences between them.The philosophy of“Monism of Perceptions”,a metaphysical premise suitable to depict Hume s epistemology,disconnects the mind from the external world and discusses the issue of cognitive norms from within perceptions.Thus Hume put forward his theory of belief and its justifications,which altered the course of development for modern epistemology and exhibited the characteristics of contemporary western epistemology.
作者
栾俊
LUAN Jun(School of Marxism,Jiangnan University,Wuxi,Jiangsu,214122)
出处
《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期10-19,共10页
Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目“休谟怀疑主义与自然主义之关系问题研究”(2019SJA0750)
江南大学基本科研计划青年基金项目(JUSRP11983)。
