摘要
本文利用2003—2016年中国278个城市的面板数据,基于地方政府竞争视角,探讨财政分权对城市创新水平的影响。结果表明:财政分权显著抑制城市创新水平的提升,且经过一系列稳健性检验后该结论依然成立;财政分权对城市创新水平的影响具有异质性,如在科教水平较低、级别较低及中小城市,财政分权显著抑制城市创新,而在科教水平较高、级别较高及大城市却并未抑制城市创新;财政分权通过促进地方政府“为增长而竞争”“为引资而竞争”、抑制地方政府“为创新而竞争”等途径对城市创新水平产生负向影响。研究结论为从政府财政体制改革视角促进城市创新提供启示。
Based on the panel data of 278 cities in China from 2003 to 2016,this paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on the urban innovation level from the perspective of local government competition.The results show that:fiscal decentralization significantly inhibits improvement of the urban innovation level,and this conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests;the impact of fiscal decentralization on the level of urban innovation is heterogeneous.Specifically,in the low level of science and education,the low level and small and medium-sized cities,fiscal decentralization significantly inhibits urban innovation,while in the high level of science and education,the high level and large cities,fiscal decentralization does not inhibit urban innovation.Besides,fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on the level of urban innovation by promoting local governments competition for growth and competition for attracting investment,while restraining local governments competition for innovation.The conclusion of this paper provides enlightenment for promoting urban innovation from the perspective of government financial system reform.
作者
何凌云
马青山
HE Lingyun;MA Qingshan(Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073)
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第10期132-144,共13页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“‘一带一路’区域价值链构建与中国产业转型升级研究”(18ZDA038)。
关键词
财政分权
城市创新
地方政府竞争
为增长而竞争
为创新而竞争
为引资而竞争
fiscal decentralization
urban innovation
local government competition
competition for growth
competition for innovation
competition for attracting investment
