摘要
通过建立投资人和平台多方均面临借款人违约风险的不完全信息博弈模型,寻找单次博弈的均衡点,再将博弈重复无限次得出了新的均衡.
A static game model of incomplete information between investor and platform who both face the default risk of borrower in the P2P lending relationship is established,and the new equilibrium is obtained on the basis of service fee profits by repeating this game model infinitely.
作者
高东杰
GAO Dongjie(College of Economics And Management,Zhengzhou University of Light Industry,Zhengzhou,Henan 450001,China)
出处
《经济数学》
2020年第3期51-54,共4页
Journal of Quantitative Economics
关键词
数理经济学
违约风险
博弈论
庞氏骗局
均衡分析
mathematical economics
default risk
game theory
Ponzi scheme
equilibrium analysis
