摘要
以单制造商和单零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,基于供应链成员是否采用无线射频识别(radio frequency identification, RFID)技术,分别构建链上成员均不采用RFID(NN)、仅制造商采用RFID(AN)、仅零售商采用RFID (NA)以及链上成员均采用RFID (AA)四种情景下的收益模型,求解出相应的最优解,并探讨链上成员采用RFID的均衡策略.研究发现:双渠道供应链采用RFID的均衡策略取决于渠道竞争强度、收益共享系数及RFID标签成本.竞争强度较小时,供应链成员均倾向于采用RFID;反之,则仅零售商倾向于采用该技术.收益共享系数较高时, AA情景不会出现;反之,若制造商采用RFID,则AA为均衡策略. RFID标签成本较低(高)时,供应链成员倾向于采用(不采用) RFID技术.
This paper studies a dual channel supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. Based on whether the supply chain partners adopt radio frequency identification(RFID), we accordingly set up the partners’ profit models under four scenarios: none of the partners adopts RFID(NN), only the manufacturer adopts RFID(AN), only the retailer adopts RFID(NA), and both of the partners adopt RFID(AA). We obtain the both of the partners’ optimal decision-variables and profits. Furthermore, we discuss the equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in the dual-channel supply chain. The study shows that the equilibrium strategies of RFID adoption in the dual-channel supply chain depend on competition intensity, revenue-sharing coefficient and RFID tagging cost. The supply chain partners tend to adopt RFID with a low competition intensity, while only the retailer is inclined to adopt RFID with a high competition intensity.AA cannot be an equilibrium strategy with a high revenue-sharing coefficient, otherwise, AA is the equilibrium strategy if the manufacturer adopts RFID. The supply chain partners tend to adopt RFID with a low tagging cost while not to adopt RFID otherwise.
作者
张李浩
吴志婷
范体军
ZHANG Li-hao;WU Zhi-ting;FAN Ti-jun(Logistics Research Center,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China;School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Business,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China)
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第10期2514-2520,共7页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71971137,71601114)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2019T120307,2019M651404)
中国科技部邮轮项目(2018-473)。
关键词
产量竞争
无线射频识别
库存错放
均衡策略
收益共享契约
cournot competition
RFID
inventory misplacement
equilibrium strategies
revenue-sharing contract