摘要
【目的/意义】粮食是关系我国国计民生的重要农作物,交易过程中价格欺诈问题严重损害了农户利益,打击农户种粮积极性,影响了粮食生产和流通。【设计/方法】通过应用演化博弈方法,分析粮食交易参与主体之间的博弈关系,探讨政府监管与补贴双重干预下粮食交易主体的策略选择及驱动因素,为政府有效监管提供理论依据。【结论/发现】结果表明,相比于单纯监管或补贴,政府监管结合补贴政策对欺诈行为约束效果更好;政府监管的积极性随社会效益、监管效率及交易规模的增加而增加。为有效约束价格欺诈行为,政府最好同时实施监管结合补贴双重干预政策,同时可以完善奖惩机制、健全监管体系、加大监管力度、发展农业经济组织来约束粮食交易欺诈行为。
[Purpose/Significance]Grain is an important crop for the national economy and people’s livelihood in China,and the problem of price fraud during transactions has seriously undermined the interests of farmers,demotivated the farmers in growing grain,thereby affecting grain production and circulation.[Design/Methodology]By applying the evolutionary game method,this paper analyzes the game relationship between participants in grain trading,discusses the strategy selection and driving factors of grain trading subjects under the dual intervention of government regulation and subsidy,and provides theoretical basis for effective government regulation.[Findings/Conclusions]Results show that the combination of government regulation and subsidy policy can better constrain fraud than regulation or subsidy alone,and the motivation of government regulation goes up with the increase of social benefit,regulatory efficiency and transaction scale.To effectively restrain price fraud,the government should implement the policy of double intervention of regulation and subsidy,enhance the reward and punishment mechanism,improve the regulatory system,strengthen regulation and develop agricultural economic organizations to restrain the fraud of grain trading.
作者
周莹莹
黄建华
ZHOU Ying-ying;HUANG Jian-hua(Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China)
出处
《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》
2020年第5期107-112,共6页
Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社科基金一般项目(13BGL059).
关键词
粮食交易
价格欺诈
政府干预
演化博弈
grain trading
price fraud
government intervention
evolutionary game
