摘要
考查由1个生产商和1个零售商构成的两级绿色供应链系统,绿色产品的市场需求由产品价格和产品绿色度共同决定。假设消费者对绿色产品的偏好程度是非对称信息,生产商无法准确预测消费者的绿色偏好。构建3种不同情形下的博弈模型,得到3种情形下的批发价、产品绿色度、零售价、生产商利润和零售商利润的最优解。比较分析3种情形下最优解的不同变化,并分析消费者的绿色偏好程度对最优决策和利润产生的不同影响。
A two-level green supply chain system which consists of one leader manufacturer and one follower retailer is considered.The market demand of green products mainly is impacted by the price and the product green degree level.Assuming that consumer’s preference for green products is asymmetric information,the manufacturer cannot accurately predict consumer’s green preference.Based on above analysis,game models are built under three different situations and the optimal solution is obtained for the wholesale price,product greenness,retailing price,manufacturer and retailer’s profit under three different conditions.The different changes of the optimal solution are compared and analyzed under three different situations and the different impact of consumers’green preference on the optimal decision and profit analyzed.The result shows that(1)the government subsidy mechanism can not only greatly improve the green degree of products,but also increase the manufacturer and retailers’profit;(2)regardless of consumers’green preference,government subsidies for unit products are negatively correlated with the wholesale price of green products while positively correlated with the greenness level of green products;(3)when consumers’preference for green products is low,the profit of manufacturers in RG decision model is higher than that in MG decision model.
作者
苑希港
张晓青
YUAN Xigang;ZHANG Xiaoqing(Business School,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou 221116,China)
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2020年第4期43-52,共10页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501161)
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(16YJC630026)
国家留学基金委资助项目(201706980022)
江苏省高校自然科学研究面上资助项目(19KJB120006)
江苏师范大学优秀博士研究生科研启动经费资助项目(18XWRS008)
江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目。
关键词
非对称信息
绿色供应链
绿色偏好
补贴机制
绿色度水平
asymmetric information
green supply chain
green preference
subsidy mechanism
green degree level
