摘要
将政府和社会资本作为风险偏好不同的有限理性人,通过构建演化博弈模型分析风险和收益的动态变化对政府合作期望和社会资本积极性的影响。结果表明:在有限理性条件下,政府如何确定初始风险分担是社会资本参与的关键,初始状态下,政府风险分担过小,随着双方博弈演进,社会资本风险收益失衡,导致合作失败;政府通过合理分担风险和让渡收益,则会吸引更多社会资本参与合作,而社会效益作为风险调节变量可控制社会资本的参与规模。
Taking government and social capital as limited rational people with different risk preferences,and constructing Evolutionary Game models,this paper analyzes the dynamic changes of risks and returns to the impact of government cooper-ation expectations and social capital initiative.Result shows that under the condition of bounded rationality,how to deter-mine the initial risk sharing mode is the key to social capital participation.Initially,the government shares less risk,the so-cial capital risk-return is gradually unbalanced as the game evolution between the two parties,leading to cooperation failure.By sharing risks and transferring benefits reasonably,the government will attract more social capital to participate in the co-operation,and social benefits as a risk adjustment variable can control the scale of participation of social capital.
作者
徐杰
李果林
XU Jie;LI Guo-lin(School of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期126-130,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14BTJ013)
云南省应用基础研究项目(2017FB104)。
关键词
演化博弈
政府
社会资本
风险收益
Evolutionary Game
government
social capital
risk-return
