摘要
对于当代真理紧缩论的典型代表,即极小真概念,戴维森认为其等价模式的具体实例不可理解,即我们无法在坚持极小真概念关于真理是客观的前提下,基于句子"p"的语义特征来理解复杂单称词项"命题(that) p"的指称。这一批评被学者称为"戴维森式反驳"。对此反驳,一些学者认为,借助戴维森处理间接引语的并列理论可以有效地回应它,但是,由于并列理论本身不成立,因而上述回应并不成功。但是,这并不意味着戴维森式反驳是可接受的:其一,如果它成立,那么受害者绝不仅仅是极小真概念;其二,戴维森式反驳的核心要求,即在等价模式中出现两次的句子"p"具有相同的语义特征,本身是一个不合理的要求。
For the typical representative of deflationary theories of truth,that is,Horwich’s Minimalism about truth,Donald Davidson believes that the concrete examples of its equivalent model are incomprehensible,that is,we cannot,while adhering to the minimalist view that truth is objective,understand the reference of the complex singular term“that p”based on the semantic features of the sentence“p”.This criticism has been referred to by scholars as“Davidsonian objection”.Some scholars have argued that this challenge can be answered by Davidson’s paratactic theory of indirect discourse,but the paratactic theory itself was not sound,so the response above was unsuccessful.However,this does not mean that Davidson’s objection to the Minimalism is acceptable:first,if it is true,then the victim is by no means merely the minimal concept of truth;second,the core requirement of Davidson’s objection,i.e.,the sentence“p”which appears twice in the equivalent model has the same semantic features in both of its appearances,is itself unreasonable.
作者
李主斌
LI Zhu-bin(School of History and Culture of Science,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期45-50,共6页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
上海交通大学青年人才科研能力培育专项项目(16X100040008)
国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB016)。
关键词
极小真概念
等价模式
间接引语
并列理论
命题(that)p
the minimal concept of truth
equivalent model
indirect discourse
paratactic theory
proposition that p.
