摘要
以2013—2018年我国创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用OLS回归分析法检验了政府直接补助和董事长总经理“两职合一”对企业研发投入的影响。研究结果表明,政府补助对非国有上市公司研发投入具有激励作用,而对国有上市公司的影响具有负向激励作用;董事长总经理“两职合一”对企业研发投入具有抑制作用,且只在非国有上市公司中显著。进一步研究发现,相比于两职分离的职权结构,董事长总经理“两职合一”对政府补助和研发投入的促进作用具有显著的负向调节作用。研究结论可为政府相关部门政策制定提供参考,为创业板上市公司领导职权治理提供借鉴。
This paper takes China's GEM listed companies in 2013-2018 as the research object,and uses OLS regression analysis method to test the impact of direct government subsidies and the combination of the chairman and general manager on the R&D investment of enterprises.The results show that the government subsidy has an incentive effect on the R&D investment of non-state-owned listed companies,but has a negative incentive effect on the R&D investment of state-owned listed companies;the combination of chairman and general manager has an inhibitory effect on the R&D investment of enterprises,which is only significant in non-state-owned listed companies.Further research shows that,compared with the power structure of separation of two positions,the combination of the two positions has a significant negative regulatory effect on the promotion of government subsidies and R&D investment.The conclusion of the study can provide a reference for the policy-making of relevant government departments,and for the leadership of GEM listed companies.
作者
郭亚亚
GUO Ya-ya(School of Accounting,Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics,Lanzhou 730030,China)
出处
《西安航空学院学报》
2020年第2期51-58,共8页
Journal of Xi’an Aeronautical Institute
关键词
创业板
政府补助
两职合一
研发投入
GEM listed companies
government subsides
CEO duality
R&D investment
