摘要
OPEC(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,简称OPEC)长期以来被认为是一个国际卡特尔组织,其通过联合各产油国限产操纵国际油价来最大化自身的经济利益。然而近年来的一些研究质疑了这一传统观点。基于两个严格定义的概念:条件独立性和可交换性,检验了OPEC各国之间行为的相关性和对于同一外生冲击的反应。结果发现,OPEC的确可以被认为是一个成员国相互联系的卡特尔组织,但是是一个组织失败的卡特尔,因为没有足够的证据表明其可以有效促成并维持成员国之间的串通合谋行为。进一步的动态稳定性检验发现,OPEC的存在并不是导致历史上几次全球油荒和油价上升的原因。
OPEC traditionally was defined as a typical international Cartel organization.It controls the worldwide oil price and maximizes its profit though limiting each member′s output and export.However,recently,this claim is challenged by new empirical evidence and theoretical hypotheses.This paper tests OPEC′s behavior based on two mathematical definitions:conditional independence and exchangeability.The result supports the Cartel hypothesis but it is dysfunctional.There lacks solid evidence to support OPEC members′collusion.The dynamic test rejects the assumption that OPEC′s collusive behavior triggers recent oil shortage.
作者
沈曦
SHEN Xi(Cargill Investment Ltd.,Shanghai 200233,China)
出处
《盐城工学院学报（社会科学版）》
2020年第1期37-48,共12页
Journal of Yancheng Institute of Technology（Social Science Edition）
关键词
OPEC
卡特尔合谋
条件独立性
可交换性
OPEC collusive behavior
conditional independence
exchangeability
