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基于进化博弈的地方政府与农户节药行为研究 被引量:2

A Study on the Behavior of Local Government and Farmers in Pesticides-Saving Based on Evolutionary Game
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摘要 在农业农村绿色发展的节药背景下,如何推动农户实现由传统用药模式到节药用药模式的转变,已经成为了亟需解决的现实问题。本文通过构建进化博弈模型,研究了地方政府与农户双方在节药大背景下的策略选择,通过复制动态方程构建与局部均衡点的稳定性探究博弈双方进化机理,并运用Matlab软件进行仿真分析。结果表明:协调进化方向受地方政府监管成本与政绩效益、节药生产补贴额、传统用药模式下的农户生产成本与收益、节药生产模式下的农户生产成本与收益等七个因素影响。建立合理地方政府考核机制、加强农产品农药残留检测、加大低毒高效农药研发力度,将有助于推动农产品质量安全的提升与国家节药政策的落实。 Under the background of green development of agriculture and countryside,how to transform farmers from the traditional pesticide use pattern to pesticide-saving use pattern has become a practical problem that needs to be solved.By constructing an evolutionary game model,this paper studies the strategies of local governments and farmers in the context of pesticide-saving.Then research the evolutionary mechanism of both sides by the construction of the replication dynamic equation and the stability of the local equilibrium point.Finally,using Matlab software to the simulation,the results show that the coordinated evolution direction is affected by the local government supervision cost and performance benefits,pesticide-saving use pattern production subsidy,production cost and income of farmers under the traditional pesticide use pattern,production cost and income of farmers under the pesticide-saving use pattern.Establishing a reasonable assessment mechanism of local government,strengthening the detection of pesticide residues in agricultural products,and strengthening the research and development of low-toxic and high-efficiency pesticides will help promote the improvement of quality and safety of agricultural products and the implementation of national pesticide-saving policies.
作者 杜森 郑纪芳 DU Sen;ZHENG Ji-fang
出处 《山东农业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2020年第1期36-42,159,160,共9页 Journal of Shandong Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
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