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风险偏好、决策情绪与CEO财务报告舞弊行为 被引量:9

Risk Appetite,Decision Mood and CEO Financial Report Fraud
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摘要 基于行为经济学的视角,运用实验方法研究风险偏好与CEO财务报告舞弊行为之间的逻辑关系,以及在决策情绪的影响下风险偏好作用机理的变化规律。利用经济计量方法,对实验研究结论进行稳定性检验。结果表明:风险偏好会对财务报告舞弊行为产生效用评价约束。在高风险状态下,风险偏好程度高的CEO,财务报告舞弊倾向要显著大于风险偏好程度低的CEO;愤怒和愉悦情绪状态下的CEO,财务报告舞弊倾向要显著大于恐惧情绪状态下的CEO;愤怒情绪状态与愉悦情绪状态下的CEO,财务报告舞弊倾向不存在显著性差异。 Based on the perspective of behavioral economics,experimental methods are used to study the logical relationship between risk appetite and fraudulent behaviors of CEO financial reports,and the changing rules of the mechanism of risk appetite under the influence of decision mood.Furthermore,the econometric method is used to test the stability of the experimental research conclusions.The results show that risk appetite will have utility evaluation constraints on financial reporting fraud.In high-risk states,CEOs with a high degree of risk appetite are significantly more likely to report financial fraud than CEOs with a low risk appetite;CEOs in a state of anger and pleasure are significantly more likely to report financially fraud than CEOs in a state of fear.There is no significant difference in the tendency of financial reporting fraud among CEOs in the state of anger and pleasure.
作者 孔晨 KONG Chen(School of Managementf Qingdao Agricultural University,Qingdao 266000,China)
出处 《经济与管理》 CSSCI 2020年第1期86-92,共7页 Economy and Management
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL005)
关键词 风险偏好 认知偏差 决策情绪 财务报告舞弊 risk appetite cognitive bias decision mood financial reporting fraud
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