摘要
文章基于博弈论理论,分别从纵向视角研究了地方政府应对上级政府委托激励的策略行为,及从横向视角分析了地方政府之间协同处理环境污染空间外溢的博弈行为。以2008—2017年13个省级行政单位的大气污染指数为被解释变量,以上级政府监管力度及地方政府之间的协作程度为解释变量,建立一种多元线性回归模型,分析地方政府策略行为对污染扩散治理的影响。研究结果表明,上级政府的严管与约束,及地方政府间的精诚协作,与污染空间外溢状况改善显著相关,而人口密度过大及第二产业比重过高等相关控制变量指标,将会对污染空间外溢治理产生不利影响。
This paper studies the strategic behavior of local governments in response to the entrusted incentives from the vertical perspective and the game behavior of local governments in collaboration with each other in dealing with spatial spillover of environmental pollution from the horizontal perspective.Taking the air pollution index of 13 provincial administrative units from 2008 to 2017 as the explanatory variable,and the degree of supervision by higher governments and cooperation between local governments as explanatory variable,a multiple linear regression model was established to analyze the impact of local government’s strategic behavior on pollution diffusion control.The results show that the strict control and restraint of higher governments and the sincere collaboration of local governments are significantly related to the improvement of pollution spatial spillover.The excessive population density and the high proportion of secondary industry will have a negative impact on the control of pollution spatial spillover.
作者
孙程
SUN Cheng(School of Management,Hebei University,Baoding Hebei 071000,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2020年第2期167-170,176,共5页
Ecological Economy
关键词
污染空间外溢
博弈论
地方政府
多元线性回归
spatial spillover of pollution
game theory
local government
multiple linear regression
