摘要
以2001~2016年177家商业银行为样本,采用面板回归及中介效应模型,实证检验管理层盈余管理动机、贷款损失准备和银行风险的作用机制,结果表明,当存在盈余管理动机时,银行管理层会显著减少贷款损失准备的规模,而贷款损失准备的减少会导致银行风险增大。进一步检验发现,在银行管理层盈余管理动机与银行风险扩张之间,贷款损失准备的下降起到了显著的中介作用,且在地方性银行和非“四大”会计事务所审计的银行中更为明显。因此,商业银行应建立更为有效的内外部监督机制,提高银行治理水平。
Using 177 commercial banks from 2001 to 2016 as samples,this study empirically tested the mechanisms of the management team s earnings management motivation,loan loss provision,and bank risk using panel regression and mediation models.The results showed that in the presence of earnings management motivation,banksx management teams significantly reduce loan loss provision,whereas a reduction in loan loss provision results in an increase in bank risk.Further tests showed that a reduction in loan loss provision has a significant mediation effect on the relationship between the earnings management motivation of banksx management teamsx and bank risk,and this effect is more obvious among local banks and banks audited by non-"Big Four"accounting firms.Hence,commercial banks should establish a more effective internal and external supervision mechanism to enhance the level of bank governance.
作者
汪峰
王佳
王帆
Wang Feng;Wang Jia;Wang Fan(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China;Xinxiang University,Xinxiang,Henan 435000,China;School of Accounting,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou,Zhejiang 310018,China)
出处
《金融经济学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期83-92,共10页
Financial Economics Research
基金
浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY18G020006)
国家社会科学基金青年项目(18CGL039)
国家自然科学基金项目(71973101)
教育部霍英东教育基金会第十六届高等院校青年教师基金(161081)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(22120190103)
同济大学重点建设项目(190164)。
关键词
盈余管理动机
贷款损失准备
银行风险
earnings management motivation
loan loss provision
bank risk
