摘要
信贷市场上借款人(企业)和贷款人常存在信息不对称,其源于企业比贷款人有信息优势。假设AK增长类型企业采用担保换股权模式获取外部融资,本文试图揭示信息不对称下企业的动态投资决策。通过分析借款者和担保公司的Nash均衡问题,得出信息对称和不对称下所有未定权益的定价。研究发现:(1)信息对称下,好企业相对于差企业仅需较少的初始资本即可进入市场,支付的担保成本较低,企业投资额、股权价值和市场进入价值更大。(2)信息不对称的存在削弱了好企业的价值,企业投资额度增加以抵御信息不对称的影响;在分离均衡中,好企业通过更低的初始资本量来传递其良好的生产率特征信号,而在混同均衡中,初始资本量介于对称信息下好坏企业初始资本量之间。研究结果可以帮助担保公司制定担保成本细则,为中小企业进入市场选择进行信号博弈提供了理论和实际指导。
Information asymmetry often happens when only one side of the traders can handle the information while others can’t.Since the productivity of the firm is often referred to as private information,it can be solely owned by the manager of the firm.The small-and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)play an important part in the development of economy and society.They are seen as the sprung root of technology innovation and the creation of job and GDP.However,the limitation of the firm and the lower credit rating with the information asymmetry often affects the difficulty of the financing attainment.To solve the dilemma,the financial intermediaries invent newly financial tools called equity-for-guarantee swap(EGS).It is a three-party agreement signed by a banker/lender,an insurer and an SME/borrower,where the bank agrees to lend at a given rate.If the borrower defaults on the loan,an insurer will pay all the outstanding interest and principal to the bank. In return, the borrower will allocate a fraction of equity to the insurer. By issuing this tool, the informationasymmetry problem transforms from the bank and the firm to the insurer and the firm.As a basic element of the real economy, the initial capital stock is an important variable when the firm decides to enter the market because it can affect thedepth of the information asymmetry solutions. Depending on the equity- and debt-financing tools, large firms will spend less on transaction cost with its reliablequality and reputation while SMEs cannot enjoy this advantage. Thus, SMEs often face the direct financing problem in the market, and they have to seekfinancial intermediaries for help. Since the initial capital will affect the firm’s dynamics by adjusting its optimal investment behavior, this index can be seen as asign to reflect the features of firms.Our research considers the behavior of an AK firm that attains its loans by EGS. We focus on considering how the information asymmetry affects thefirm’s optimal initial capital and investment. First, based on the s
作者
刘琦
唐小林
杨招军
LIU Qi;TANG Xiao-lin;YANG Zhao-jun(School of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University,Changsha 410079,China;Department of Finance,Southern University of Science and Technology,Shenzhen 518055,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第4期159-166,共8页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371068)
国家自然科学基金创新群体资助项目(71521061)
关键词
信息不对称
担保换股权
初始资本
AK增长类模型
动态投资
Asymmetric information
Equity-for-guarantee swap
Initial capital
AK-type growth model
Dynamic investment
