摘要
针对供应商和制造商存在不同议价能力的情形,构建了制造商从上游常规供应商和紧急供应商订货的两阶段优化模型。通过反向倒推的方法,求出了制造商最优的订货量以及最优的批发价格。借助数值实验,分析了常规供应商议价能力、合同的有效性和需求波动性对最优决策的影响。研究结果表明,随着供应商议价能力的增强,制造商从常规供应商的订货量减少,此时的批发价格较高;当制造商设定的合同越有效,制造商更倾向于向紧急供应商订货,而减少向常规供应商订货量;当需求波动性增大时,制造商的订货量下降。
Under the traditional supply chain structure,the upstream supplier is a leader and makes a“take it or leave it”offer to the downstream manufacturer.So the wholesale price is determined by the supplier pursuing profit maximization,and the effect of double marginalization will arise.However,with the development of globalization,the downstream manufacturer’s bargaining power becomes stronger.The typical way is dual sourcing.The manufacturer procures a certain quantity of products from the main supplier who has a long lead time and better quality before the selling period,according to anticipated demand.When the actual demand exceeds the procurement,the manufacturer can place an urgent order with the local supplier or emergent supplier.When the manufacturer designs an efficient incentive contract,the expected ex-post profit will be higher.We can see that the existence of emergent supplier can enhance the bargaining power of the manufacturer.If the main supplier determines a higher wholesale price,the manufacturer will reduce the ordering quantity from the main supplier and order more from the emergent supplier to satisfy the realized demand,and the profit of the main supplier will decrease.To obtain a win-win outcome,the supply chain partners should negotiate the optimal wholesale price by Nash bargaining.The existing literature on bargaining power is mostly about the determined environment that the ordering quantity satisfies the demand.There is limited literature about the influence of bargaining power on the manufacturer’ordering quantity decisions in the stochastic demand.Thus,this research aims to examine(1)how bargaining power affects the optimal decisions when the demand is stochastic,and(2)how does the existence of emergent supplier affect the manufacturer’s bargaining power.This article considers a two-level supply chain structure consisting of two upstream suppliers and a downstream manufacturer,who have different bargaining power.First,we adopt the game theory to establish a two-stage optimizatio
作者
周品
徐和
陆芬
ZHOU Pin;XU He;LU Fen(School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第4期130-135,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271092)
关键词
议价能力
订货策略
博弈
Bargaining power
Order policy
Game theory
