摘要
监事会能否发挥应有的治理功能历来备受争议,焦点之一是何种类型的监事会更有效。本文以中国资本市场2007-2016年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验监事会经济独立性对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现:(1)当监事会经济独立性增强时,企业违规行为的发生概率和程度都显著降低;(2)区分监事会成员职位后显示,上述治理功能发挥主要由监事会主席的经济独立性推动所致;(3)当内部控制有效性下降或企业所处地区的法律环境较差时,监事会经济独立性的治理功能更强。进一步分析揭示,经济独立性有助于监事会治理功能发挥主要因代理成本降低所致。本文丰富和拓展了既有的监事会有效性学术文献,也为完善上市公司监事会制度提供了新的思路。
As an important part of China’s regulatory system, whether the board of supervisors can play a proper governance role is always a controversial issue. It can be argued that there are two reasons for this. Firstly, scholars have not made targeted analysis in combination with China’s social and cultural characteristics and the actual specific situation of corporate operation. Secondly, scholars only pay attention to the basic characteristics of board of supervisors, such as size of the board of supervisors, but ignore in-depth analysis of essential characteristics of the board of supervisors, such as independence and professional background. Among all of the above characteristics, independence is the most fundamental characteristic which can affect the effectiveness of supervision. Therefore, how to improve independence level of the board of supervisors for enhancing the effectiveness of the board of supervisors deserves to be further explored. However, it is unfortunate that how to measure the independence of the board of supervisors is difficult in the current academic circles. Based on this consideration, this article analyzes independence characteristics of the board of supervisors from economic interest perspective tentatively. Using A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016 in China’s capital market as sample, the article tests the impact of economic independence of board of supervisors(EIBS) on corporate fraud empirically and also considers the specific situation analysis. The results show that: ① when EIBS increases, the probability and extent of corporate fraud declines significantly;② after distinguishing the position of board of supervisors, the above function is promoted by chairman’s EIBS;③ as internal control effectiveness declines or legal environment deteriorates, governance function of EIBS enhances. Further analysis indicates that EIBS can reduce agency costs to put forward governance function. The article reveals that the board of supervisors system with high economic independence
作者
周泽将
马静
胡刘芬
Zhou Zejiang;Ma Jing;Hu Liufen(School of Business,Anhui University;School of Management,Xiamen University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期62-76,共15页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71772001)
国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790602)
安徽省高校学科(专业)拔尖人才资助项目(gxbjZD02)资助
关键词
经济独立性
监事会
治理功能
企业违规
Economic Independence
Board of Supervisors
Governance Function
Corporate Fraud
