摘要
研究了电商引入自有品牌产品和制造商入驻模式选择之间的博弈竞争关系,构建了双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法解析得到双方不同策略下的利润,在此基础上比较双方利润,得到不同条件下的均衡策略。研究发现,制造商销售模式的选择受到电商引入自有品牌策略的影响。当佣金比例过低或过高时,引入自有品牌策略不会影响销售模式的选择,此时佣金费用决定了销售模式的选择;当佣金比例适中时,引入自有品牌则制造商会选择代销模式,不引入则会选择分销模式。平台佣金比例和消费者对自有品牌的认可程度会影响电商引入自有品牌的策略,较高的消费者认可程度反而促使电商不引入自有品牌。
The introduction of private brands and the choice of manufacturers'sales modes are prevailing business phenomena nowadays.The relationship between the introduction of private brand products and the choice of manufacturers'sales modes are studied,and the Stackelberg game model of both parties is constructed.The reverse induction method is used to calculate the profits of channel members under different strategies.On this basis,the profits of both parties are compared to get the equilibrium strategy under different conditions.The study found that the choice of the manufacturer's sales mode is influenced by the introduction of private brand strategy in e-commerce.When the commission ratio is too low or too high,the introduction of private brand strategy will not affect the choice of sales modes.At this time,the commission fee determines the sales mode selection;when the commission ratio is moderate,the manufacturer will introduce the agency mode under the introduction of private brands,and otherwise he will choose the distribution mode;in addition,the platform commission ratio and the consumer's recognition of the private labels will affect the introduction of private brands.The higher degree of consumer recognition has prompted e-commerce not to introduce private brands.
作者
蔡仁雷
聂佳佳
CAI Renlei;NIE Jiajia(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiao tong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2019年第6期118-126,共9页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672153)
四川省社会科学研究规划重大项目(SC17ZD09)
四川省社会科学重点研究基地—系统科学与企业发展研究中心重点资助项目(Xq17B04)
