摘要
绿色发展已成为经济高质量发展时代的鲜明主题,但改进企业环境治理绩效仍然任重道远。在绿色政绩考核体系下,地方官员变更将对企业环境治理产生重大影响。基于上市公司数据的实证研究结果显示,由地方官员变更引发的政策不确定性有助于提升企业环境治理水平,而政治关联会抑制企业环境治理水平,企业可能通过政治关联来削弱政策不确定性对企业环境治理的促进作用;在考虑官员异地调任、企业所有制性质、地理区位等因素的条件下,政策不确定性对企业环境治理的促进作用更为显著。为此,应加强对地方政府的环境监管力度,减少政企合谋空间,并完善领导干部跨地区交流调任制度,突出绿色绩效在官员绩效考核体系中的重要地位。
Under the green performance appraisal system,the change of local officials will have a significant impact on enterprise environmental governance. The empirical research results which based on the data of listed companies show that the policy uncertainty caused by the change of local officials is helpful to improve the level of corporate environmental governance,while enterprises may weaken such promotion through the political association since the political connection will inhibit the level of corporate environmental governance. Taking into consideration the transfer of officials from different places,the nature of enterprise ownership,and the location under the condition of rational location and other factors,policy uncertainty plays a more significant role in promoting corporate environmental governance. Therefore,it is necessary to strengthen the environmental supervision of local governments and reduce the collusion space between government and enterprises,to perfect the transfer system about cadres across-regional communication,and highlight the important role of green performance appraisal.
作者
钟廷勇
何玲
孙芳城
Zhong Tingyong;He Ling;Sun Fangcheng
出处
《江海学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期84-89,254,共7页
Jianghai Academic Journal
基金
国家社科基金项目“长江经济带环境审计协同机制构建及路径研究”(项目号:17XJY007)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“长江上游地区环境审计协同机制研究”(项目号:19JJD790011)
重庆市社科基金项目“长江经济带环境绩效评价及优化研究”(项目号:2018YBGL052)的阶段性成果
重庆市教委科学技术项目“产业政策与企业盈余生成过程干扰:微观传导机制和路径研究”(项目号:KJQN20190835)资助
