摘要
针对需求依赖价格的产品,研究由供应商主导-Stackelberg博弈下,供应商的最优商业信用策略制订及零售商的订购决策和定价策略,同时,与分散化独立决策和集成供应链决策的相关结果进行综合对比分析。研究发现:供应商提供商业信用能够降低市场价格,促进销量,使零供双方的利润都能得到Pareto改善;供应商降低生产成本而提高批发价格时,给予零售商更长的商业信用,使零供双方的利润都得到极大的提升,两者利润总和甚至超过集成供应链的总利润。
In the paper,an uncooperative replenishment schedule with variable trade credit is considered under a supplier-Stackelberg game with price-dependent demand for two cases in a two-echelon supply chain.The focus is discussing which condition induces the retailer and supplier to accept the trade credit mechanism to increase their own total profits.Meanwhile,in order to obtain comparative results,the optimal policies without trade credit under a decentralized environment and a centralized environment are established respectively.Through numerical example and sensitivity analysis,the main insights obtained are as follows:(i) trade credit can reduce the retail price and boost sales,meaning that the supplier is more likely to participate in the proposed strategy;(ii) when the supplier reduces its production costs and increases wholesale prices,giving the retailer a longer trade credit,the profits of both sides will be greatly improved,and the combined profits can even exceed the total supply chain profits of the center supply chain.
作者
吴成锋
赵秋红
马艳红
陈明
WU Cheng-feng;ZHAO Qiu-hong;MA Yan-hong;CHEN Ming(College of Economics and Management,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061,China;School of Economics and Management,Beihang University,Beijing 100083,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Information Science&-Technology University,Beijing 100192,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第5期49-55,共7页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471006)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(16YJC630135)
山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19BJCJ10)
