摘要
频频曝光的美国公司丑闻揭示出了股票期权制度以下问题 :股票期权制度未能达到预期的激励效果 ;期权在不纳入成本时会人为地夸大企业利润 ,而高层管理人员追求股价上涨的利益冲动在监管等制度不完善时会促使其不择手段地进行财务造假 ,从虚涨的股价中获得巨额期权收益 ;最终 ,使普通投资者蒙受巨大损失。我国在试行该激励制度时应正视所存在的问题。在目前条件不成熟的情况下 ,多数企业还需要结合实际 ,寻找更适合本企业特点的激励方式。
Exposed scandals of American companies disclose following problems: the stock-option scheme can hardly arrive at the expected incentive purpose. The company profits will be overestimated artificially if stock-option cost is not counted, which usually causes its stock prices to rise consistently. And when senior managers (CEOs) can make a profit from the stock price rise, they would be indulged in pursuing great option income from high price stock by falsifying financial statements under imperfect supervision system, which ultimately results in damaging common stockholders' interests. Chinese enterprises ready to perform similar reform should learn from all these problems. At present, we suggest that most enterprises choose proper incentive means suitable for themselves.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第6期73-77,共5页
Finance & Economics
关键词
股票期权制度
企业
股票期权
财务造假
(Stock Option Scheme) (Reexamination) (Listed Companies)
