摘要
本文以2006-2013年我国A股首次实施股权激励的民营上市公司作为研究对象,采用动态视角全面分析了激励效应,并对股权激励实施过程中髙管的择时行为进行了研究。结果发现:(1)股权激励样本在预案公告的各窗口内均产生了显著为正的超额回报。同时,股权激励与企业绩效显著正相关。回归系数在股权激励实施后的第一年达到最大,之后激励效应逐渐减弱。(2)股权激励并不总是有效的,公司高管存在择时行为,可能会在股权激励实施前一年进行向下的盈余管理,在财务业绩较差时推出股权激励计划。(3)公司高管还倾向于在股价较低时授予期权的激励计划,使得授予公告日后样本股票的累计超额回报显著高于公告前。我们还发现,限制性股票计划的财务激励效果弱于股票期权激励。本文的研究结果表明,虽然股权激励的整体正面效应大于负面效应,但还应该加强股权激励的监督和约束机制,抑制公司高管的择时行为,并对激励方案做出精细化、差异化的设计。
In this paper, the private listed companies that first implemented equity incentive in A-share market in China from 2006 to 2013 are taken as the research object, the incentive effect is comprehensively analyzed from a dynamic perspective, and the timing behavior of executives in the process of implementing equity incentive is studied. The results show that: Firstly, the sample of equity incentive has produced significant positive excess returns in each window of the plan announcement. At the same time, equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with corporate performance. The regression coefficient reaches its maximum in the first year after the implementation of equity incentive, and then the incentive effect gradually weakens. Secondly, equity incentive is not always effective. Corporate executives have timing behavior, and will conduct earnings management downward one year before the implementation of equity incentive. Thirdly, executives also tend to grant option incentive schemes when the stock price is low. As a result, the cumulative excess returns of sample stocks after the announcement are significantly higher than those before the announcement. We also find that the financial incentive effect of restricted stock plan is weaker than option incentive. The results of this study show that although the overall positive effect of equity incentive is greater than the negative effect, we should strengthen the supervision and restraint mechanism of equity incentive, restrain the timing behavior of executives, and make a fine and differentiated design of incentive schemes.
作者
沈红波
王悦
田淳
SHEN Hong-bo;WANG Yue;TIAN Chun
出处
《财务研究》
2019年第5期68-78,共11页
Finance Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972120)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402086)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790011)
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(15JJD630008)
关键词
股权激励
高管择时
股票期权
限制性股票
盈余管理
equity incentive
executive timing
stock option
restrictive stock
earnings management
