摘要
区域经济一体化条件下对流动要素的征税使得地方政府在税率与税基之间的取舍变得相当微妙。通过建立渐进一体化背景下反映中国特征的税收竞争模型,本文从新经济地理学视角针对地方政府的税收竞争展开研究。研究表明:(1)在一体化阶段I,高的企业家区际流动税率弹性决定区际税收竞争取“逐底”的竞争形式,长期竞争均衡下区际税率差收敛于零,“政策租”与集聚租均不存在。(2)在一体化阶段II,集聚租亦不存在。企业家间接效用差值曲线波峰形成“税收盾牌”效应,税收竞争转向“逐顶”,区际税率差从零开始逐渐扩大,允许周边地区通过适用相对低的税率提供“政策租金”。(3)在一体化阶段III,集聚租取代间接效用差值曲线波峰发挥“税收盾牌”效应,区际税率差在一体化阶段II的基础上随集聚租先上升再下降,集聚租被核心地区政府和企业瓜分。区际税率差失去为周边政府提供“政策租金”操作空间的机能。(4)整个一体化进程中,区际最大税率差沿“钟型”曲线演化,区际税率差边界曲线对竞争初始状态表现出高度路径依赖。(5)在不存在税收政策协调的非合作性竞争情形,区际税收政策的不对称将导致产业分布和经济发展的空间不对称提前发生并随时间放大。
The taxation of mobile factors such as entrepreneurs, labor, and capital in the process of economic integration complicates the trade-off between tax rates and tax bases, with the trade-off dominating the developmental policy making and implementation in large developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil. In light of the new economic geography (e.g., Ludema and Wooton, 2000;Baldwin and Krugman, 2004;Borck and Pfluger, 2006), studies at the international level and in developed country settings have shown that agglomeration forces can reverse the results of the standard international tax competition and that the tax competition between local governments increases the tax gap between the rich “core” and the poor “periphery” and carves out a bell-shaped path. Although similarities can be found in tax competition both within and without national borders, modeling efforts are still needed to capture the different features of the tax competition between local governments in the different regions within large developing countries. However, in this regard, the framework of Baldwin & Krugman (2004) is not directly applicable in the settings of smooth or gradual integration typically found in developing countries because of the potential discrepancies in their specification of the government utility functions for different regions and the discontinuities in these functions arising from catastrophic agglomeration. Moreover, Baldwin & Krugman (2004) and Borck & Pfluger (2006) appear to use different decision making rules in deriving the tax rates/tax volumes exercised by the governments in the core and the periphery. In particular, while the governments in the periphery apply the principle of utility maximization, the governments in the core apply the “no de-location condition”, which implies the maximization of the share of industries. We note that even if there is an equilibrium in the tax game between two parties as in Baldwin & Krugman (2004) and Borck & Pfluger (2006), the outcome of a game between t
作者
刘安国
卢晨曦
杨开忠
LIU Anguo;LU Chenxi;YANG Kaizhong(Capital University of Economics and Business;Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期167-182,共16页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71733001)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473012)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(17ZDA059)的资助
关键词
经济一体化
积聚租金
政策租金
税收竞争
区域协调发展
Economic Integration
Agglomeration Rent
Policy Rent
Tax Competition
Harmonized Regional Development
