摘要
目前我国农村河道污染问题十分严重,厘清多元主体的利益关系是破解河长制下农村河道治理困境的关键所在。在假设博弈主体均为有限理性的条件下,利用演化博弈工具研究了河长制下农村河道治理的问题。界定了农村河道治理过程的农村河长、职能机构、农村居民3个重要主体,并且分析了其策略选择及相互关系;利用演化博弈工具探讨了三方的演化过程,并对其渐进稳定性进行分析,讨论了不同主体的演化稳定策略;针对演化博弈分析结果,同时考虑非设定条件的影响,从规范河长绩效考评标准、完善职能机构奖惩机制、构建河长制信息化平台等多个角度对农村河道治理问题提出建议。
At present,the problem of rural river pollution in China is very severe. Clarifying the relationship among the stakeholders is the key to solve the dilemma of rural river management under the River Chief System. Under the assumption of the stakeholders' bounded rationality, the evolutionary game tool is used to study the problem of rural river management under the River Chief System. Firstly, three important stakeholders are defined in the rural river management: rural river chiefs,functional institutions and rural residents,and their strategic choices as well as interrelationships are analyzed. Secondly,the evolution of the three stakeholders is discussed by using the evolutionary game tool,and the gradual stability of the evolution model is analyzed. The evolutionary stability strategies of different stakeholders are discussed. Finally, according to the model analysis results and the influences of non-set conditions,some suggestions for the rural river governance issues are proposed for the smooth implementation of the river system in rural areas,such as standardizing the performance evaluation criteria for river chiefs, improving the reward and punishment mechanism of functional institutions,and constructing the information platform of River Chief System.
作者
庞庆华
杨晓卉
姜明栋
PANG Qinghua;YANG Xiaohui;JIANG Ming-dong(School of Business Administration,Hohai University,Changzhou 213022,China)
出处
《水利经济》
2019年第5期59-65,80,共8页
Journal of Economics of Water Resources
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(19YJAZH068)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2018B25414)
江苏省社会科学基金(19GLB023)
关键词
河长制
农村河道治理
多元利益主体
演化博弈
River Chief System
rural river regulation
multi-stakeholder
evolutionary game
