摘要
脱贫背景下PPP项目财政补偿的研究有利于帮助政府为贫困地区发展PPP项目财政补贴机制的设计提供了一定的建议,也为政府在贫困地区对PPP项目的管理提供了重要的理论依据.本文以贫困地区的PPP项目为背景,在考虑政府方和社会投资者方之间的风险偏好的基础上,构建Stackelberg博弈决策模型,从社会效益(集中决策)和项目收益(分散决策)的角度考虑了PPP项目的财政补偿机制,得出贫困地区发展PPP项目最优补偿方案.贫困地区的PPP项目考虑政府和私人投资风险偏好的Stackelberg博弈决策模型在集中决策下达到了最优解,实现项目社会效益和自身收益的均衡.
The research on the financial compensation mechanism of PPP projects under the background of poverty alleviation provide some suggestions for the design of financial subsidies for the development of PPP projects in poverty-stricken areas,and also provides an important theoretical basis for the government to manage PPP projects in poverty-stricken areas.Based on the PPP project in poverty-stricken areas,this paper constructs the Stackelberg game decision-making model based on the risk preference between the government and the social investors,from the perspective of social benefits(centralized decision-making)and project benefits(decentralized decision-making).Taking into account the financial compensation mechanism of the PPP project,the optimal compensation plan for the development of PPP projects in poor areas was obtained.The Stackelberg game decision model considering the government and private investment risk preference in PPP projects in poverty-stricken areas achieves the optimal solution under centralized decision-making,achieving the balance between project social benefits and self-revenue.
作者
朱黎
王松江
ZHU Li;WANG Songjiang(Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China;City College,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650051,China)
出处
《昆明理工大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2019年第4期117-126,共10页
Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70962003)
