摘要
地方城市落实车辆避让行人政策以来,车主和行人两方面产生新的衍生问题。基于创新社会治理理论,在社会学层面建立车辆避让行人政策衍生问题博弈模型。博弈结果表明:社会环境和惩处力度是影响车主和行人行为的重要因素;行人处于人车博弈中的弱势地位,车主不会主动避让行人;行人行为除了受监管因素的影响,还受到自身心理活动的影响。由此,从政府部门角度出发提出车辆避让行人的创新治理路径。
Since the implementation of the vehicle evasion pedestrian policy in local cities, car owners and pedestrians have created new derivative problems. From the perspective of innovative social governance, a game model of vehicle avoidance pedestrian policy derivative problem is established based on sociological level. The game results show that the social environment and punishment are important factors affecting the behavior of car owners and pedestrians;pedestrians are in a weak position in the car and the game, the car owners will not actively avoid pedestrians;pedestrian behavior is affected by regulatory factors, but also by their own psychological activities Impact. Therefore, from the perspective of government departments, it is proposed to avoid the pedestrians’ innovative management path.
作者
行若竹
高凤妮
XING Ruozhu;GAO Fengni(Academy of Marxism,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)
出处
《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
2019年第4期65-71,共7页
Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition
关键词
车辆避让行人
社会治理
信用机制
vehicles avoid pedestrians
social governance
credit mechanism
