摘要
高管风险承担行为对公司治理至关重要,目前分析高管股权激励影响其风险承担行为的文献非常缺乏。本文选取沪深两市上市公司作为样本,研究高管股权激励薪酬对管理层风险承担行为是否有影响以及有何种影响。考虑到股权激励的内生性,使用了高管股权激励的行业均值作为工具变量来消除其内生性影响。结果显示,高管的股权激励对管理层的总风险承担行为、非系统风险承担行为正相关,与系统风险相关的风险承担行为无关。相对于第一大股东未发生变更的公司,受到外生冲击的公司高管的股权激励对风险承担行为的积极影响弱化,这种弱化现象只表现在管理层的总风险承担和非系统风险承担上,也就是说,高管的股权激励无论是第一大股东发生变更的公司还是未发生变更的公司都与管理层的系统风险无关。国有控股上市公司比非国有控股上市公司的高管股权激励对管理层风险承担的影响更强,其中高管股权激励仍然与系统风险承担无关。消除股权激励可能存在的内生性问题后,高管的股权激励对总风险承担行为和非系统风险承担行为的影响具有稳定且显著的正向影响,影响效应远远大于未考虑内生性时候,且高管的股权激励薪酬仍然与系统风险承担行为无关。
Since 2005, the number of equity incentive of listed companies has continued to grow, and especially since 2010, equity incentive plans have been widely implemented in A-share companies, generally having adopted stock option incentive mode with low cost. Until the end of 2015, 808 listed companies had carried out the equity incentive plan, involving 1110 equity incentive plans, of which 229 companies have launched two or more than two of the equity incentive plans, and which have promoted science and technology innovative company obviously. From the perspective of maximizing the interests, listed companies prefer the introduction of equity incentive plan during the stock market downturn and the company's share price is undervalued. Equity incentive plan has played an active role in optimizing the corporate governance structure, reducing agency costs, improving management efficiency, and enhancing the company's cohesion and market competitiveness. Based on current research literature, there is no consensus on the relationship between executives’ incentive compensation and managerial risk taking. The main conclusions have included a positive correlation, the negative correlation, and nonlinear relationship. There are two main problems in these researches: firstly, previous research about the effects of equity incentive compensation on risk-taking behavior has usually indirectly derived from corporate investment policy instead of direct effects on firm risk. The impact approach of the company's investment policy on the management incentive is usually more complex, and it is easy to consider some of the interference factors, which has led to making the conclusion of lack robustness. Secondly, this kind of research has ignored the endogeneity of the equity incentive and argued that there is the only single effect that the executive stock ownership incentive affects the management risk behavior, except the interaction between them. In fact, the executive stock ownership incentive has been rooted in the corporate envi
作者
朱琪
陈香辉
侯亚
ZHU Qi;CHEN Xiang-hui;HOU Ya(South China Research Center for Market Economy,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China;Scientific Laboratory of Economic Behaviors,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第3期24-34,共11页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71572062)
关键词
高管股权激励
风险承担行为
工具变量
样本选择模型
差分法
Equity-based executive compensation
Executives’risk-taking behavior
Instrumental variable
Sample selection model
DID
