摘要
创新是维护中国经济可持续增长的重要手段,高管激励与企业创新之间的关系一直是学术界研究的热点话题,但由于存在内生性问题,高管薪酬与企业创新之间是否存在因果关系尚无定论。以2009年出台并实施的针对国有企业的限薪令作为外生政策冲击,选取2007年至2015年全部A股上市企业为样本,采用配对样本和双重差分回归分析的方法,实证检验与非国有企业相比,限薪令后国有企业高管货币薪酬是否降低;在此基础之上,检验高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间是否存在因果关系,并进一步利用主成分分析的方法测量公司治理水平,考察公司治理水平对于高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间关系的调节作用;最后对比国有企业与非国有企业在风险承担水平上的差异,探讨高管货币薪酬的降低可能引起的负面效应。研究结果表明,与非国有企业相比,限薪令后国有企业高管的相对货币薪酬降低,限薪令发挥了预期的作用;进一步检验发现国有企业的相对创新投入水平降低,证实了高管货币薪酬与企业创新投入之间的因果关系。此外,公司治理越差的国有企业,其创新投入降低的越多;高管货币薪酬的降低最终导致国有企业整体风险承担水平下降。使用全样本分析和倾向得分匹配法进行稳健性检验,结论依然成立。利用强制性降低高管货币薪酬这一外生事件,为高管激励与企业创新之间的因果关系提供了新的可靠证据,具有重要的学术价值。在实践意义上,高管货币薪酬的降低抑制了企业创新投入的意愿,进而导致企业整体风险承担水平下降,长此以往将损害企业长期发展能力,同时有悖于现阶段中国倡导的企业走创新发展之路,对中国现阶段正在进行的国有企业改革提供政策启示。
Innovation is an important means to maintain the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The relation between management incentives and corporate innovation has attracted significant attention in academia. However,due to the existence of an endogenous problem,whether there is a causal relationship between executive compensation and corporate innovation or not is still inconclusive.This study employs the government-imposed executive compensation limit regulation( hereafter pay limit) for the state-owned enterprises( hereafter SOEs),issued and implemented on 2009,as an exogenous research setting. The sample consists of all Ashare listed companies from 2007 to 2015. By adopting matched samples and difference-in-difference( DID) method,this study first tests whether the executive monetary compensation of the SOEs is lower than that of the non-state-owned enterprises( hereafter NSOEs) after the Pay Limit. Then this study examines whether there is a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. Furthermore,using the Principal Component Analysis to measure the level of corporate governance,this study tests the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation investment. In addition,this study explores the potential negative effects of the reduction in executive monetary compensation by comparing the differences in the level of risk-taking between SOEs and NSOEs.The result shows that the executive monetary compensation of SOEs is decreased compared with that of NSOEs after the Pay Limit. This finding indicates that the implementation of the Pay Limit has played its expected role. Further evidence reveals that the corporate innovation investment of SOEs is decreased relatively to NSOEs,proving the existence of a causal relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate innovation. In addition,the worse the corporate governance of SOEs,the more their innovation investment is
作者
徐经长
乔菲
张东旭
XU Jingchang;QIAO Fei;ZHANG Dongxu(School of Business,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230039,China)
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期120-134,共15页
Journal of Management Science
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(17XNH071)
国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目(201706360261)~~
关键词
限薪令
国有企业
高管货币薪酬
企业创新投入
公司治理
风险承担
pay limit
state-owned enterprises
executive monetary compensation
corporate innovation investment
corporate governance
risk-taking
