摘要
在一个分权的多级政府框架下,减税政策本质上是一个集体行为问题。本文以中国取消农业税改革为研究重点,深入剖析中央地方利益协调下减税政策的增收效应。理论研究表明,取消农业税对农民收入的一般均衡效应,不仅取决于改革对农民税费负担的直接影响及其对农民生产决策的影响,更取决于中央地方利益协调及其引致的地方政府收支政策行为反应的影响,因而效应是不明确的。基于2000-2010年县级数据的经验分析发现,取消农业税有利于农民增收,但这并非主要源于农民总体税费负担的下降,而主要是因为地方政府获得较大的利益补偿(转移支付收入规模增加)、故而财政支出尤其农林水支出规模显著增加所致。取消农业税后,地方财政收入规模并未显著减少,且非农部门税收收入和土地出让收入规模均没有显著增加,意味着地方政府更倾向通过加强其他涉农税费的征管来弥补改革造成的财力损失,农民的总体税费负担很可能没有明显减轻。这对于新时期供给侧结构性改革中减税政策的有效运用具有良好启示。
In a decentralized framework of multi-level governments,tax reduction policies are essentially a collective behavior problem.Focusing on China’s abolishment of agricultural tax,this paper analyzes the income increasing effects under interests coordination between central and local governments.The theoretical analysis shows an uncertainty of general equilibrium effects of the tax-reduction.The aggregated effect depends both on the direct effect of the tax-reduction policy on farmers’tax burden and on the indirect effect of local governments’revenue and expenditure policies’reaction to the interests coordination between central and local governments.Drawing on a county-level dataset between 2000 and 2010,we then empirically find that the abolishment of agricultural tax increases farmers’income.Moreover,the positive effect is not driven by the release of farmers’tax burden-after the abolishment of agricultural tax,the expenditure scale of local governments does not significantly decrease and the tax collected from nonfarm sectors and land revenue increase little,indicating that local governments are more inclined to strengthen the management of other agricultural-related taxes.In contrast,the positive effect derives mainly from the compensation received by the local governments(transfer payments),which supports the increasing productive expenditure.Our findings provide important implications of using tax-reduction policies in the structural reform of supply-side in current China.
作者
贾俊雪
秦聪
孙传辉
张珂玮
JIA Jun-xue;QIN Cong;SUN Chuan-hui;ZHANG Ke-wei(School of Finance,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;National Academy of Development and Strategy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China;Institute for Finance and Economics,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期79-97,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“推动中国经济中高速可持续增长的突破性改革:地方政府治理体系改革”(批准号17ZDA048)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于中国实践的财政分权理论”(批准号71673279)
关键词
中央地方利益冲突与协调
减税政策
取消农业税改革
interests coordination between central and local governments
tax-reduction policies
abolishment of agricultural tax
