摘要
中国式分权情境下,地方政府对于中国宏观经济具有重大影响。本文利用 2008 年四万亿政策这一准自然实验,采用双重差分法探究了政策刺激下,地方政府如何利用刺激政策来影响当地企业的债务融资。不同于以往基于整体经济情况研究四万亿政策效应的文献,本文结合地方政府干预程度与企业异质性对四万亿政策影响的传导机制进行了更深入的探究。实证结果发现:(1)四万亿政策下,国企获得了更多的债务融资;(2)基于金融危机而出台的四万亿政策,其政策效应弱于金融危机带来的冲击效应,因而导致金融危机期间,受经济冲击越大的城市,当地企业的债务融资情况越差;(3)金融危机冲击之下,四万亿刺激政策期间,保增长压力较大的城市,会更加激进地借助中央政策,显著地推高国企债务融资;(4)四万亿政策期间,保增长压力越大的地区,其政府干预程度越大,越有能力改善当地企业债务融资情况。本文的研究发现增进了人们对中央政策通过地方政府影响经济的传导机制的理解。
Because of China’s unique decentralized system, local governments occupy an important position in the transmission mechanism of China's macroeconomic policies. To explore deeper the role of local government in this process, we regards the 4 trillion Yuan fiscal stimulus as a quasi-natural experiment, using the method of double difference estimation and data in 2006-2013,studying how local governments use stimulus policies to influence the debt financing of local firms. The empirical results show that:(1) With the 4 trillion policy, state-owned enterprises will obtain more debt financing;(2) The 4 trillion policy promulgated to deal with the financial crisis has weaker policy effects than the huge impact of financial crisis. Worse economic situations will make local enterprises have a worse financing environment.(3) During the period of the financial crisis, growth pressure will make local government more active to use the stimulus policy and significantly increase the leverage of state-owned enterprises;(4) During the mechanism of the four trillion policy, growth pressure will make local government with a higher degree of government intervention more capable of improving the debt financing of local enterprises. This paper helps to understand the transmission mechanism of central government policy on the economy.
作者
王贤彬
王淑芳
WANG Xian-bin;WANG Shu-fang
出处
《产业经济评论》
2019年第3期50-67,共18页
Review of Industrial Economics
关键词
刺激计划
债务融资
经济压力
国有企业
Economic Stimulus Plan
debt financing
growth pressures
state-owned enterprise
