摘要
不管行政性还是市场化去产能政策,对企业家预期和企业生产决策都产生实质性影响。本文从产能控制权视角出发,研究了产能调控政策如何影响企业家预期。研究发现,我国产能调控衍生出了市场体系中并不需要人为界定的产能控制权,如产能审批权、过剩和落后产能界定权、淘汰指标分配权以及依附于环境污染权的企业生产经营权。监管机构如何行使这些权利影响企业生产经营权,而这是改变企业家预期的关键变量。当去产能和污染防治双重硬约束叠加,稳定企业家预期是当务之急,清晰厘定环境污染权和企业生产经营权之间的权利关系是关键,还应明确和限制监管机构及地方政府的自由裁量权。
Regardless of administrative or market-based de-capacity policies, it has a substantial impact on entrepreneurial expectations and corporate production decisions. From the perspective of capacity control, this paper studies how capacity control policies affect entrepreneurial expectations. The study finds that China’s capacity control derived from the market system does not need artificially defined capacity control rights, such as capacity approval authority, excess and backward production capacity definition rights, elimination of indicator allocation rights, and the enterprise production and management rights which are attached to environmental pollution rights. How the regulators exercise these rights to affect the production and management rights of enterprises, and this is a key variable that changes the expectations of entrepreneurs. When the double hard constraints of de-capacity and pollution prevention are superimposed, it is imperative to stabilize entrepreneurs’ expectations. It is the key to clearly determine the rights relationship between environmental pollution rights and enterprise production and management rights, and it should also clarify and limit the discretion of regulators and local governments.
出处
《经济学家》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期62-69,共8页
Economist
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“我国制造业内外资企业竞合博弈与市场势力问题研究”(14CJY037)
中央党校校级重点课题项目“产能过剩问题研究”
关键词
去产能模式
产能控制权
产权效率
企业家预期
De-capacity Mode
Capacity Control
Property Efficiency
Entrepreneurial Expectation
